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ARTICLE 
 
ADAPTING TO THE NEW SHAREHOLDER-CENTRIC 
REALITY 
EDWARD B. ROCK† 
After more than eighty years of sustained attention, the master problem of U.S. 
corporate law—the separation of ownership and control—has mostly been brought 
under control. This resolution has occurred more through changes in market and 
corporate practices than through changes in the law. This Article explores how 
corporate law and practice are adapting to the new shareholder-centric reality that 
has emerged. 
Because solving the shareholder–manager agency cost problem aggravates 
shareholder–creditor agency costs, I focus on implications for creditors. After consid-
ering how debt contracts, compensation arrangements, and governance structures 
can work together to limit shareholder–creditor agency costs, I turn to available 
legal doctrines that can respond to opportunistic behavior that slips through the 
cracks: fraudulent conveyance law, restrictions on distributions to shareholders, and 
fiduciary duties. To sharpen the analysis, I analyze two controversies that pit 
shareholders against creditors: a hypothetical failed LBO, and the attempts by 
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defendant directors). 
  
  
1908 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1907 
shareholders of Dynegy Inc. to divert value from creditors through the manipulation 
of a complex group structure. I then consider some legal implications of a share-
holder-centric system, including the importance of comparative corporate law, the 
challenges to the development of fiduciary duties posed by the awkward divided 
architecture of U.S. corporate law, the challenges for Delaware in adjudicating 
shareholder–creditor disputes, and the potential value of reinvigorating the tradi-
tional “entity” conception of the corporation in orienting managers and directors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that the central problem of U.S. corporate law for the last 
eighty years—the separation of ownership and control—has largely been 
solved. Suppose further that the solution came mostly through changes in 
market and corporate practices rather than through changes in the law. 
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What should corporate law and practice focus on now? This Article opens a 
discussion about how corporate law should adapt to the new shareholder-
centric reality that has emerged over the last thirty years by focusing on the 
implications for creditors. 
Historically and comparatively, corporate law seeks to control three sorts 
of agency costs: those between managers and dispersed shareholders, 
between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders, and between share-
holders and creditors.1 Because the magnitude of these agency costs is 
interrelated, changes in the severity of one sort of agency cost will affect the 
severities of the others.2 In shareholder-centric corporate law systems like 
the United Kingdom, creditor protection is a prominent feature. 3  By 
contrast, in manager-centric corporate law systems, as in the United States 
over much of the last eighty years, corporate law’s creditor-protection 
features seem to atrophy. What happens when a system shifts from being 
manager-centric to shareholder-centric? How can it adapt to the new reality 
and respond to the increased need for creditor protection? 
In this Article, I argue that, since the early 1980s, the U.S. system has 
shifted from a manager-centric system to a shareholder-centric system. This 
shift has occurred primarily through changes in managerial compensation, 
shareholder concentration and activism, and board composition, outlook, 
and ideology, rather than directly through legal change.4 With respect to the 
most important decisions—such as changes in control—there is substantial 
reason to believe that managers and directors today largely “think like 
shareholders.” 
If this is right—if we have evolved into a shareholder-centric system—
then the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem should return as a 
central concern of corporate law. Further, to the extent that we have evolved 
into a shareholder-centric system through changes in practice rather than 
law, the law is unlikely to have kept pace. This Article analyzes how the 
U.S. corporate law system has adapted to, and can continue to adapt to, this 
new shareholder-centric reality and the shareholder–creditor agency costs 
that accompany it. I do not argue for changes in the law per se, but I do 
want to pose the question whether existing law is adequate to respond to the 
different kinds of problems that emerge. As I describe below, we have a 
variety of tools for responding to these changes: contracts, compensation, 
 
1 REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY HANS-
MANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35 (2d ed. 2009).  
2 See infra Part II. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 356-362. 
4 This may partially explain why so few law professors seem to have noticed it. 
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governance arrangements, and legal doctrines (including fraudulent convey-
ance law, restrictions on distributions, and fiduciary duties).5 
Do we have all the tools we need? Do we need to develop new tools? Do 
we need to use existing tools in new ways? Reasonable minds can differ on 
these important details, but what is clear, I think, is that we need to be alive 
to the characteristic forms of shareholder–creditor opportunism so that we 
can respond appropriately. In Part IV, after considering how contracts, 
compensation, and governance arrangements can and do respond to these 
challenges, I examine two controversies illustrating the kinds of behavior 
that can slip through the basic web of protections and pose challenges: a 
doomed leveraged buyout (LBO), and shareholder manipulation of compli-
cated corporate subsidiary structures to divert value from creditors.  
In a world in which managers’ high-powered equity incentives make 
them think and act like shareholders, it is important to remind managers 
and directors that the goal of the exercise is to create valuable firms, not to 
maximize shareholder value as an end in itself. Focusing on creditors as a 
group, despite the conflicts that exist among them, can be a useful proxy for 
the wider social impact of maximizing shareholder value at the expense of 
firm value.  
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE LAW SYSTEM:  
THE WANING OF THE “SHAREHOLDER–MANAGER  
AGENCY COST PROBLEM” 
The separation of ownership and control has been the master problem of 
U.S. corporate law since the days of Berle and Means, if not before.6 
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars began to describe this in terms of “share-
holder–manager agency costs.” In this Part, after a brief historical overview, 
I review the classic agency cost analysis and then consider the extent to 
which things have changed.7  
 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 
(1984) (“[A]fter half a century, discussion of the corporate form still invariably begins with Berle 
and Means’ location of the separation of ownership and control as the master problem for 
research.”). 
7 William Bratton and Michael Wachter come to a similar conclusion, from a different direc-
tion, regarding the waning of shareholder–manager agency costs. William W. Bratton & Michael 
L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 675-88 (2010). 
Lynn Stout has been a prominent voice arguing against “shareholder value maximization.” See 
generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
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A. A Brief Historical Background 
Between the Civil War and World War I, the United States followed a 
model of “financial capitalism” in which the large, capital-intensive busi-
nesses (railroads, oil, steel, communications, electricity, etc.) were financed 
and monitored by a concentrated group of banks led by the Morgan bank.8 
The capital needs of large enterprises required the development of equity 
and debt markets and became the foundation of the U.S. capital markets. 
Because of these companies’ ongoing capital needs, their bankers exercised a 
great deal of influence, often placing directors on the boards, replacing 
underperforming managers when necessary, and keeping managers focused 
on profitably developing their companies.9 During this period, the agency 
costs of management in public corporations were relatively low, constrained 
by the monitoring by financial intermediaries. 
After World War I and through the 1920s, this model broke down for a 
variety of economic reasons (e.g., growth of individual stock ownership) and 
political factors (e.g., progressive critiques and congressional investiga-
tions).10 By the time of the enactment of the Glass–Steagall Act in 1933, the 
United States had shifted toward “managerial capitalism.”11 Freed from the 
banks by new regulations enforcing a separation of finance and commerce, 
no one substituted for J.P. Morgan and the other large, well-placed inves-
tors. Executives typically selected directors, who in turn did not effectively 
monitor the executives. 12  Product markets were largely insulated from 
international competition and thus permitted a great deal of managerial 
“slack” before threatening firm solvency. Shareholdings were widely  
dispersed with few mechanisms for overcoming barriers to shareholder 
 
8 J. Bradford De Long, Did J.P. Morgan’s Men Add Value?: An Economist’s Perspective on Financial 
Capitalism, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF 
INFORMATION 205, 205 (Peter Temin ed., 1991). 
9 See id. at 214-18 (recounting the monitoring function Morgan’s bankers performed when 
serving on boards of directors); see generally RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN 
AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 1-161 (1990) (discussing 
the bank’s rise during the years leading up to World War I). 
10 See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 
31-53 (1991) (examining the economic, legal, and political pressures that led to the downfall of 
financial capitalism). 
11 For the classic historical account of the emergence of “managerial capitalism” in the United 
States, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
12 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the 
United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001) (“The 
corporate governance structures in place before the 1980s gave the managers of large public 
corporations little reason to focus on shareholder concerns. . . . [B]efore 1980, management was 
loyal to the corporation, not to the shareholder.”). 
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collective action. Executive ownership of equity was very low, so executives 
did not have strong financial incentives to maximize firm value. 
The period of the “managerial” firm transformed officers’ and directors’ 
understandings of their roles. They saw themselves as loyal to the corpora-
tion rather than to the shareholders. They flirted with the idea of being 
“trustees” of the corporate enterprise. They embraced the notion that they 
were supposed to manage the corporation for the benefit of all its stake-
holders. 
During this period, firms retained earnings beyond the immediate need 
for investment in profitable projects.13 This further insulated firms from 
capital market pressures, as they could fund investments without selling 
stock. As a largely unintentional and unnoticed side effect of managerialism, 
the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem slipped from view. 
B. The Classic Agency Cost Analysis 
Beginning more or less with Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 
classic 1976 article, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, finance economists and law professors shifted their 
discussion from the “separation of ownership and control”—the phrase 
popularized by Berle and Means—to shareholder–manager “agency costs.”14 
In reviewing these classic discussions, there are several strands of the 
analysis that found at least a certain degree of empirical support. 
1. The Core Incentive Story 
To start with, there is an incentive story. In a structure in which share-
holders bear the residual risk while managers hold fixed claims, managers’ 
interests will diverge from those of the shareholders, with managers prefer-
ring a greater degree of financial certainty than diversified (and thus risk-
neutral) investors.  
The structure of compensation can affect firm value in several ways. First, 
pay structures will have a selection effect: performance-based compensation, 
its advocates argue, is likely to disproportionately attract higher-skilled and 
 
13 See Philip G. Berger, Eli Ofek & David L. Yermack, Managerial Entrenchment and Capital 
Structure Decisions, 52 J. FIN. 1411, 1419-22 (1997) for evidence that firms with entrenched managers 
use less leverage. 
14 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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less–risk averse managers.15 Second, they can have a lock-in effect: perfor-
mance pay that vests over time, as well as long-term options, can help retain 
key employees.16 Finally, pay structures can have a behavioral effect: fixed 
pay may lead managers to seek quiet lives, while performance pay can 
motivate managers.17  
Studies of managerial compensation during the 1960s and 1970s showed 
that managers were almost entirely compensated on a fixed basis with few 
equity-linked performance incentives. 18  Thus, Brian Hall and Jeffrey 
Leibman report that, in 1980, annual chief executive officer (CEO) compen-
sation was mainly in the form of cash salaries and bonuses, with only thirty 
percent of CEOs receiving new stock option grants.19  
This lack of performance sensitivity led Jensen and Kevin Murphy to 
argue that, if CEOs are paid like bureaucrats, “[i]s it any wonder then that 
so many CEOs act like bureaucrats rather than the value-maximizing entre-
preneurs companies need to enhance their standing in world markets?”20  
2. The “Free Cash Flow Problem” 
In the classic analysis, the shareholder–manager conflict of interest leads 
managers to adopt a variety of different policies that are not in the interest of 
diversified shareholders. Thus, some argue that managers will have an 
incentive to retain excessive amounts of “free cash flow” (funds over and 
above current profitable investment needs) because doing so insulates 
managers from the market discipline resulting from the need to attract 
investment in new issuances of equity.21 The classic example cited by Jensen 
was the oil industry in the wake of the tenfold increase in price (and resulting 
recession) in 1973. Oil industry managers found themselves with huge 
amounts of free cash flow during a period of industry consolidation. Rather 
than distributing the excess cash to shareholders, they overinvested in the oil 
industry and made value-decreasing acquisitions in unrelated industries.22  
 
15 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 3, 4 (2002). 
16 Id. at 15. 
17 Id. 
18 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 
J. POL. ECON. 225, 257-58 (1990).  
19 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 
653, 663 (1998). 
20 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But 
How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138, 138. 
21 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323, 323 (1986).  
22 Id. at 326-27. 
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3. Managerial Empire-Building 
Another reflection of managerial agency costs could be seen in ineffi-
cient levels of corporate acquisitions—or “empire-building.” Because 
managers of large enterprises are better compensated than managers of 
smaller enterprises,23 managers have a private incentive to expand—even 
when doing so is not justified by the returns to shareholders.24 A complemen-
tary explanation for costly diversifying acquisitions is that they may reduce 
the variance of a firm’s returns. This benefits managers, who depend on their 
firms for their high (largely fixed) salaries, even though shareholders can 
diversify more cheaply at the portfolio level.25  
A number of management theories developed that justified conglomerate 
mergers as offering a more efficient mode of enterprise organization. Some 
argued that professional managers replaced unsophisticated self-taught 
entrepreneurs. 26  Others argued that conglomerates facilitated divisional 
monitoring by a central office.27 Still others argued that  
the central office reallocated investment funds from slowly growing subsidi-
aries, which generated cash, such as insurance and finance, to fast growing 
high technology businesses, which required investment funds. In this way, 
each conglomerate created an internal capital market, which could allocate 
investment funds more cheaply and efficiently than the banks or the stock 
and the bond markets.28 
In fact, however, during the 1960s and 1970s, when diversifying conglomerate 
acquisitions were all the rage, the results for shareholders were disappointing. 
 
23 See Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical 
Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11, 32 (1985) (finding, empirically, that “in addition to shareholder 
return, sales growth is an important determinant of executive compensation”). 
24 Jensen, supra note 21, at 323. 
25 Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate  
Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 606 (1981). 
26 For a brief overview, see HENRY MINTZBERG, MINTZBERG ON MANAGEMENT: INSIDE 
OUR STRANGE WORLD OF ORGANIZATIONS 153-72 (1989). 
27 See id. at 165-69. 
28 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 249 SCIENCE 745, 
746 (1990). But see Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 137-39 (arguing against the efficiency of 
internal capital markets). 
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4. Dispersed Ownership, Passive Shareholders,  
and Captured Directors 
On the classic account, what makes these high levels of agency costs pos-
sible is a combination of dispersed ownership, which leaves shareholders 
passive, and directors who are appointed and controlled by the CEO.  
These explanations found substantial empirical support. During this 
period, shareholding was at least as widely dispersed as it had been since 
Berle and Means’ analysis in the early 1930s.29 As an analysis of shareholders’ 
collective action problems would predict, shareholders were in fact mostly 
passive. Finally, studies largely confirmed the assertions that CEOs con-
trolled director appointments and that directors viewed themselves as 
serving at the CEO’s pleasure.30  
5. Managerial Entrenchment and the Resistance  
to Hostile Tender Offers 
Finally, in the classic account, the most potent engine of managerial  
accountability—the hostile tender offer—was undermined by management’s 
defensive tactics, by structural features such as staggered boards, and by legal 
innovations upheld by Delaware courts, such as poison pills.31 Again, this 
account found support in contemporaneous developments. 
6. Evidence on the Magnitude of Agency Costs 
Agency costs can rarely be observed directly. In the classic agency cost 
analysis, the best evidence adduced for significant agency costs has been the 
magnitude of the premiums paid in change-in-control transactions and, in 
particular, those paid in management buyouts. For example, Jensen argued 
 
29 See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 
443, 457 (2009) (citing “[a] number of studies done in the 1960s and 1970s indicat[ing], in the 
spirit of Berle and Means, that dispersed ownership was the norm” and noting this view remained 
the “received wisdom on ownership and control”). 
30  See JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE  
REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 20-23 (1989) (finding the composition of most 
boards to be “heavily influenced by the CEO”); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND 
REALITY 72-85 (1971) (detailing the strength of CEO control, attributed in part to control over 
board appointment). 
31 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 162-66 (1991) (describing tender offers as a method of control for 
shareholders, but noting that Delaware courts have routinely upheld management’s defensive 
mechanisms against them). 
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that the high premiums (averaging fifty percent) in the 1980s-era leveraged 
buyouts were evidence of significant agency costs.32  
C. Subsequent Developments: 1980 to the Present 
Just as the new shareholder–manager agency cost paradigm was sweep-
ing academia, the world began to change. As I describe below, corporate law 
played a largely peripheral role, with market practices taking the lead. In 
this Section, I briefly summarize these dramatic developments across each 
of the dimensions identified in the classic agency cost account.33  
1. The Core Incentive Story 
Compensation structures are now well-aligned with shareholder value. 
The biggest development since the 1980s is that CEOs now have large 
amounts of equity and equity-linked compensation. Jensen and Murphy’s 
original “CEOs are paid like bureaucrats” argument34 was undermined in 
two ways. First, by looking at the effect of performance on CEOs’ stock and 
option holdings, one gets a much fuller view of the performance–
compensation link than by simply comparing changes in salary and bonus to 
changes in firm value. Second, starting in 1980, firms began to provide their 
CEOs with large amounts of equity-linked compensation. 
Thus, although it may have been correct in 1980 to say that CEOs were 
largely paid with cash salary and bonuses, the reality has changed dramati-
cally. Between 1980 and 1994, the percentage of CEOs receiving stock 
options rose from 30% to close to 70%.35 By 1999, 94% of S&P 500 compa-
nies granted options to their top executives.36 By 1998, “the median values 
 
32 Jensen, supra note 21, at 325; Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences,  
2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 31-32 (1988). 
33 This Section summarizes points made in much greater detail in a series of articles that 
Marcel Kahan and I have published over the last decade. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. 
Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473 (2003) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism]; Marcel Kahan & Edward 
B. Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge 
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007) [hereinafter 
Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
871 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying]; Marcel Kahan & Edward 
Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347 (2011). 
34 See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
35 Hall & Liebman, supra note 19, at 663. 
36 Hall & Murphy, supra note 15, at 4. 
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of stock and options held by Standard & Poor’s industrial CEOs and 
Standard & Poor’s financial CEOs were $30 million and $55 million, 
respectively.”37 During the 1993–1998 time period, “the ratio of equity 
portfolio value to annual total pay was 30.3 on average for CEOs.”38  
More recent data confirm this trend. John Core and Wayne Guay exam-
ined the pay-performance relationship for the S&P 500 CEOs from 1993 to 
2008.39 After converting option values to stock equivalents, they find that 
the median CEO receives approximately $5.2 million in annual compensa-
tion and holds the equivalent of approximately $40.2 million in firm equity.40 
This yields a ratio of annual pay-to-“stock equivalent value” (a proxy for the 
effective equity holdings in the firm) of 14.5%.41 Put differently, the median 
CEO’s equity ownership is roughly six times his or her annual compensa-
tion. This implies a very significant performance sensitivity with most of 
that sensitivity deriving from the CEO’s equity holdings and relatively little 
from annual compensation.42  
Others have looked specifically at CEO incentives in the all-important 
change-in-control context. Here, too, incentives have changed. Susan 
Elkinawy and David Offenberg, by comparing companies in which unvested 
stock and options vest on takeover with those in which they do not, and 
using a matched sample of nonacquired companies, show that premiums are 
significantly higher when the CEO’s contract includes accelerated vesting.43 
Their study also finds that in 75% of the acquisitions in their sample period 
(2005–2009), the CEO’s employment contract provided for accelerated 
vesting in a change of control.44 In sum, then, the evidence is clear that, 
whatever the state of play in the 1960s and 1970s, CEO wealth is now 
strongly linked to shareholder value. Although one can find outliers, there is 
 
37 John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and 
Incentives: A Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 28-29 (citing an earlier version 
of Hall & Murphy, supra note 15).  
38 Id. at 29 (citing John E. Core, Wayne Guay & Robert E. Verrecchia, Are Performance 
Measures Other than Price Important to CEO Incentives? 38 tbl.1 (London Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. EFA 0418, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=214132).  
39 See John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too Low? A 
Wealth-Based Contracting Framework (Jan. 28, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544018. 
40 Id. at 34. 
41 Id. 
42 See also Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2008, at 
5, 11 fig.5 (2008) (comparing CEO salaries with and without equity compensation). 
43 See Susan Elkinawy & David Offenberg, Accelerated Vesting in Takeovers: The Impact on 
Shareholder Wealth, 42 FIN. MGMT. 101, 111 (2013). 
44 Id. at 106. 
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no empirical basis for assuming any general divergence between the CEO’s 
incentives and shareholder value. 
2. The “Free Cash Flow Problem” 
Since 1980, there has been a dramatic reduction in retained earnings and 
an increase in corporate debt. From 1984 to 1990, approximately 3% of net 
public equity was retired each year, totaling around $532 billion for the six 
years.45 Figure 1, Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan’s chart showing net 
equity issuances, is revealing:  
 
Figure 146 
 
 This widespread reduction of equity continued into the 2000s, peaking 
in 2007.47 One effect of this massive increase in leverage is reflected in 
Figure 2, showing that between 1982 and 2009, the number of AAA-rated 
nonfinancial corporations had dwindled from sixty-one to four.48  
 
 
45 Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 124-25. 
46 Id. at 125 fig.3. 
47 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7, at 685-87. 
48 See also Richard John Herring, How Financial Oversight Failed and What it May Portend for 
the Future of Regulation, 38 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 265, 266-67 (2010) (noting the decline in AAA-
rated nonfinancial firms).  
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Figure 249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sole remaining survivors are ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Johnson & 
Johnson, and Automatic Data Processing.50 
This decline in AAA corporate bonds does not reflect a general choice 
by firms not to issue debt. Although a few well-known and very successful 
firms with large retained earnings would have AAA-rated debt if they issued 
any (e.g., Apple), overall corporate debt is at a very high level. According to 
the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, corporate debt has grown in all but two 
years since 1978.51 In absolute amounts, annual corporate borrowing has 
dramatically increased since the late 1970s.52 The result is that the corporate 
sector’s outstanding debt has increased roughly ten times, from $757 billion 
in 1978 to $7300 billion in 2010.53  
 
49 This chart is taken from Eric Dash, AAA Rating Is a Rarity in Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/business/aaa-rating-is-a-rarity-in-business.html?_r=1&emc= 
eta1#. 
50 Ben Steverman, Pfizer Loses its Triple-A Credit Rating, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2009/10/pfizer_loses_its_triple-
a_credit_rating.html.  
51 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS THIRD QUARTER 2011, at 7 tbl.D.1 (2011).  
52 Id. at 8 tbl.D.2.  
53 Id. at 9 tbl.D.3.  
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Put differently, the “free cash flow problem” that figured so prominently 
in the classic account as evidence of high managerial agency costs has 
largely disappeared.  
3. The Decline of Managerial Empire-Building 
The fashion of diversifying into unrelated lines of business that was 
popular from the 1950s through the 1970s came to an abrupt end in the 
1980s. With a change in antitrust policy, mergers between firms in the same 
industry (horizontal mergers) and between customers and suppliers (vertical 
mergers) were no longer considered per se suspect.  
The 1980s saw an explosion of deconglomeration. Many conglomerates 
built during the 1950s and 1960s were acquired and broken up, with individual 
divisions typically sold to firms in the same industry.54  
Alongside these market developments, management theories changed. A 
return to specialization ensued, with “focus” as the key watchword. Some 
conglomerates were broken up by hostile or friendly takeovers, others by 
selling or spinning off divisions. The empirical evidence has been clear that 
spinning off unrelated businesses leads to a significant improvement in 
operating performance.55 As one important study stated, “[T]he operating 
performance improvement is . . . consistent with the hypothesis that 
spinoffs create value by removing unrelated businesses and allowing managers 
to focus attention on the core operations they are best suited to manage.”56  
Since the 1990s, spinoffs have been a popular way to increase focus. 
Sears spun off Allstate in 1995.57 AT&T spun off Lucent in 1996.58 CBS 
carved out its radio operations in Infinity Broadcasting in 1998.59 DuPont 
sold off Conoco in 1999 (and it subsequently merged with Phillips to 
 
54 See generally Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 12. 
55 See, e.g., Lane Daley, Vikas Mehrotra & Ranjini Sivakumar, Corporate Focus and Value Crea-
tion: Evidence from Spinoffs, 45 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 266 (1997); Hemang Desai & Prem C. Jain, Firm 
Performance and Focus: Long-Run Stock Market Performance Following Spinoffs, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 75, 
90 (1999); James A. Miles & James D. Rosenfeld, The Effect of Voluntary Spin-Off Announcements on 
Shareholder Wealth, 38 J. FIN. 1597, 1605 (1983); Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Effects of 
Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Voluntary Spin-Offs, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 437, 447 (1983). 
56 Daley, Mehrotra & Sivakumar, supra note 55, at 280. 
57 Sears, Roebuck & Co. Spins Off Its Stake in Allstate Division, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1995, at B2. 
Sears started Allstate in 1931 and, until it was spun off, the insurer had always been part of Sears. 
See id. Now, of course, Allstate is viewed as a completely separate company. 
58 AT&T Sets Distribution of Rest of Lucent Shares, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1996, at B2. 
59 Infinity Broadcasting Initial Public Offering Is Priced at $20.50, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at B23. 
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become the sixth-largest publicly traded oil company).60 And there are 
many more examples. 
4. Dispersed Ownership, Passive Shareholders,  
and Captured Directors 
As Marcel Kahan and I have catalogued in detail elsewhere,61 the old 
story of dispersed ownership, passive shareholders, and directors under the 
thumb of an imperial CEO is no longer accurate.  
Share-ownership concentration has continued its nearly inexorable rise, 
leading some informed observers, like Brian Cartwright, then Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) General Counsel, to identify the “deretailiza-
tion” of the stock market as one of the most important developments 
affecting the SEC’s role.62 The composition of institutional holdings has 
changed: assets have shifted from corporate defined-benefit pension funds 
(historically very passive) to mutual funds (which are much more willing to 
support shareholder activism).63 Activist hedge funds have emerged as new 
players with high-powered incentives and receive support from more 
traditional institutions, in terms of both funds to invest and votes cast 
during confrontations with portfolio companies.64 Finally, proxy advisory 
firms—Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis—have 
emerged as information intermediaries and catalysts to shareholder action.65 
These pressures, combined with regulatory changes, have transformed 
the governance structure of large publicly held firms. Staggered boards—
generally viewed as the most powerful antitakeover device—are in decline. 
Between 2003 and 2009 in the S&P 100, the number of companies with 
staggered boards declined from forty-four to fifteen.66 That decline has 
spread to smaller companies as well.67 Majority voting for directors has 
swept the field with boards caving in to shareholder demands.68 “Say on 
 
60 DuPont Completes Split Off of Conoco, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1999, at C19; Phillips, Conoco Set 
Merger, CNNMONEY (Nov. 19, 2001, 11:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2001/11/19/deals/Phillips_ 
conoco. 
61 See generally Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 33. 
62 Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Address at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School Institute for Law and Economics: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) 
(transcript available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm). 
63 Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 33, at 997-98, 1001-05. 
64 See generally Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance, supra note 33. 
65 Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 33, at 1005-07. 
66 Id. at 1008 tbl.2. 
67 Id. at 1009. 
68 Id. at 1010-11. 
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Pay” is now mandatory.69 Through changes in listing requirements and 
much greater attention to the board’s monitoring functions, boards have 
become much more independent of CEOs than they were in the past. For 
example, it is no longer uncommon for outside directors to meet without 
the CEO present.70 
Increased CEO turnover is perhaps the most dramatic indication of 
change. Booz Allen estimates that between 1995 and 2006, annual CEO 
turnover has increased by 59% and performance-related turnover by 318%.71 
The cumulative effects of these changes can be seen in how directors’ 
self-understanding of their roles has evolved (what one might call “director 
ideology”). Companies, shareholders, business schools, corporate law pro-
fessors, and judges all seem to believe that the primary responsibility of 
directors is to maximize shareholder value. Whether in favor or opposed, 
the prevalence of this principle is widely recognized. Thus, a critical 2010 
Businessweek article opened with the telling phrase, “If business school were 
a church, shareholder value maximization would be its religion.”72  
5. Managerial Entrenchment and the Undermining of  
Hostile Tender Offers 
In the classic account, as described above, hostile tender offers could 
constrain managerial agency costs if only the law would let them. In prac-
tice, a workaround has been achieved through compensation contracts and 
greater board independence, rendering the legal barriers largely pointless.73 
In effect, a Coasean bargain was struck between shareholders and managers 
in which managers’ legal “entrenchment entitlement” was bought out. 
 
69 Id. at 1034-36. 
70 As required by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, stock exchanges mandate at least one such meeting 
per year. See NASDAQ OMX, STOCK MARKET RULE 5605(b)(2) (2009); NYSE LISTED COM-
PANY MANUAL § 303A.03 (2009).  
71 Chuck Lucier, Steven Wheeler & Rolf Habbel, The Era of the Inclusive Leader, STRATEGY 
+BUSINESS, Summer 2007, at 3; see also Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO 
Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 83 (2012) (finding that CEO turnover at Fortune 500 
companies since 1998 implies an average tenure of less than six years, which is substantially lower 
than in previous periods, especially compared to the average decade-long tenures of thirty years 
ago). 
72 N. Craig Smith & Luk Van Wassenhove, How Business Schools Lost Their Way, BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2010-01-11/how-business-schools-
lost-their-waybusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. 
73 See Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying, supra note 33, at 902 (showing how 
contracts and institutional structures reduced the entrenchment effect of poison pills); Mark J. 
Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1254-56 
(2002) (noting that institutions may effectively “‘buy[]’ managers off from opposing takeovers”). 
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The mean CEO of an S&P 500 corporation now receives approximately 
$5 million in annual salary and bonuses and holds approximately $40 million 
in stock or its equivalent.74 The CEO’s change-in-control package typically 
includes 2.99 times salary and bonuses, plus acceleration of unvested stock 
options.75 Finally, average CEO tenure is approximately six years.76 So 
imagine that an average CEO in his fourth year receives an offer to buy the 
company for even a small premium above current market price, say twenty 
percent. What are the CEO’s financial incentives with regard to the offer? If 
the company is sold, the CEO will receive $15 million in change-in-control 
payments and an $8 million increase in the value of his shares, for a total of 
$23 million. If the company is not sold, the CEO will receive an additional 
two years of salary and bonus for approximately $10 million. The choice is 
stark: $23 million now, and a chance to do something else, versus working 
hard for the next two years for $10 million.77  
If incentives are effective, then this set of incentives will result in under-
performing management stepping aside voluntarily in response to even a 
small premium offer to buy the company. Put differently, incentive compen-
sation contracts can substitute for hostile tender offers as a means of 
replacing bad managers with good ones. Despite Delaware’s board-centric 
takeover jurisprudence from the 1980s that approved poison pills and 
deferred to board judgment, mergers and acquisitions have remained at very 
high levels.78 
The power of incentives can be seen in the practical irrelevance of even 
the most potent current antitakeover provision—namely, the charter-based 
staggered board combined with a poison pill, a combination that can allow a 
company to remain independent for a year and a half against a determined 
bidder.  
First, the staggered board has become an endangered species because 
firms have given in to shareholder pressure with little resistance.79 Second, 
even where they exist, staggered boards seem to have only minimal effects on 
changes in control. Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian 
 
74 Core & Guay, supra note 39, at 36 tbl.3. 
75 Elkinawy & Offenberg, supra note 43, at 112 tbl.III. 
76 Kaplan & Minton, supra note 71, at 81. 
77 Dirk Jenter and Katharina Lewellen find that the likelihood of a bid rises by 50% as the 
CEO approaches the age of sixty-five. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, CEO Preferences and 
Acquisitions 10 (CESifo Working Paper No. 3681, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1975751.  
78 See Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying, supra note 33, at 897 (suggesting that 
the tactics described above made an end run around Delaware’s takeover standard). 
79 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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argue for judicial intervention to undermine the charter-based staggered 
board combined with a poison pill, based on a study of the effect of these 
boards on hostile bids during the period from 1996 to 2000.80 They identify 
ninety-two hostile bids during this period, finding that of the forty-five bids 
involving companies with staggered boards, twenty-seven remained inde-
pendent.81 By contrast, of the forty-seven hostile bids involving companies 
without staggered boards, only sixteen remained independent.82 In other 
words, in eleven companies, the staggered board arguably resulted in the 
company remaining independent when it might otherwise have been 
acquired.  
To put this in context, there were approximately 3000 acquisitions  
between 1996 and 2000, about half of which involved companies with 
staggered boards.83 During this period, there were only ninety-two hostile 
bids, only forty-five hostile bids against companies with staggered boards, 
and, of those, at most eleven in which a staggered board plus poison pill 
prevented sale. Academics’ stubborn focus on the “problem” of managerial 
resistance to hostile takeovers is remarkable, considering the irrelevance of 
takeover defenses in a world in which managers are incentivized to think 
like shareholders.  
6. Evidence on the Magnitude of Agency Costs 
As noted above, some have viewed the magnitude of premiums in going-
private transactions as evidence of managerial agency costs. It is now clear 
that there are a variety of explanations for premiums in going-private 
transactions, and the empirical evidence on whether these transactions in 
fact involve firms with excess free cash flow is mixed.84 Private equity’s 
high-powered incentives, combined with high-powered monitoring, can 
generate wealth unrelated to agency costs by facilitating restructuring 
decisions that are more difficult in public companies.  
 
80 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitake-
over Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 925, 944-45 (2002). 
81 Id. at 930, 932. 
82 Id. at 930. 
83 Kahan & Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism, supra note 33, at 505. 
84 For a review of the evidence, see Charlie Weir, David Laing & Mike Wright, Incentive  
Effects, Monitoring Mechanisms and the Market for Corporate Control at Going Private Transac-
tions in the UK 7-8 (Feb. 28, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=379101. 
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7. What Remains of the Classic Shareholder–Manager  
Agency Cost Problem? 
If the core shareholder–manager agency cost problem now seems largely 
under control (even if there will always be outliers), what aspects remain? 
From a theoretical perspective, one can identify several remaining diver-
gences, although the actual magnitude of these problems is unclear. First, 
incentives can be too effective even from a shareholder perspective: a CEO 
may have an incentive to sell the company even if it would be in the best 
interests of the shareholders to refuse all current offers.  
Second, even if managers’ incentives are aligned with shareholders, 
managers will still want to maximize their compensation. Management 
compensation can be too high even if its structure is appropriate. Third, if 
managers are overinvested in their own firms, they may manage more 
conservatively than diversified shareholders would wish.85 Fourth, small and 
very small public corporations may still have high shareholder–manager 
agency costs because many of the levers of corporate governance that 
squeeze out agency costs in larger public corporations are missing.86 Finally, 
end games raise issues that can be difficult to control. Even managers with 
an optimal compensation contract may still have an incentive to feather 
their nests when the company is being sold. 
As interesting as these issues are, they are better characterized as “mop-
ping up operations” than the grand battles against entrenchment and agency 
costs of the 1980s. The evidence summarized above, it seems to me, at least 
shifts the burden to the anti–agency cost crusaders to show that managerial 
agency costs remain significant. 
II. SHAREHOLDER–CREDITOR AGENCY COSTS 
Suppose I am right that the shareholder–manager agency cost problem 
has been brought under control through a combination of incentive com-
pensation, board reforms, changes in the concentration of shareholdings, 
 
85 See Amihud & Lev, supra note 25, at 615 (presenting a study finding that manager-
controlled firms pursue risk reduction through conglomerate mergers to a greater extent than 
shareholders may desire); Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk 
Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51 J. FIN. 1097, 1111-12 (1996) (arguing that 
conservative financial policies may be one way firms deal with risk). Risk-averse management can 
be combated by using option compensation to “add convexity” to compensation contracts. Core, 
Guay & Larcker, supra note 37, at 33. In other words, the large upside value of stock options can 
incentivize CEOs to adopt optimal strategies that their overinvestment in the firm may cause 
them to otherwise resist.  
86 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Governance of Small Public Corporations (manu-
script in progress) (on file with author). 
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and changes in the willingness of shareholders to oppose management. 
What then? Is it the end of history for corporate law?87 Should corporate law 
focus on additional tweaks to the system to try to wring out the remaining 
shareholder–manager agency costs, on the implicit assumption that any 
level of managerial agency costs is too high?  
In our preoccupation with the classic “separation of ownership and con-
trol” or, more recently, the “shareholder–manager agency cost problem,” we 
seem to have forgotten what other corporate law systems have not: that 
there are three corporate law agency cost problems, not one.88  
Before turning to adaptive strategies, it is worth recalling the elements 
of the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem. At its core, the problem is 
that shareholders, holding the residual claim on the firm, have an incentive 
to externalize risk onto creditors and other fixed claimants. Risk can be 
shifted to creditors in at least four different ways.89 First, firms can dilute 
their asset bases (“asset dilution”) by siphoning off corporate assets to 
shareholders. Second, firms can substitute more risky assets for less risky 
assets (“asset substitution”), increasing the riskiness of the firm, which 
benefits shareholders at the expense of creditors. Third, the firm can dilute 
creditors’ claims (“debt dilution”) by adding unanticipated new debt that is 
of equal or superior seniority to existing debt claims. Finally, the firm may 
refrain from issuing new equity, even when it has positive net present value 
projects, because of the priority of existing debtholders (“debt overhang” or 
“underinvestment”).90  
So long as managers are in control and think like fixed claimants, retain-
ing free cash flow, creditors will be relatively secure. That is what a AAA 
credit rating means: “Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest 
quality, subject to the lowest level of credit risk.”91 
 
87 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). 
88 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
89 For the following discussion, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 116-21 (discussing 
asset dilution, asset substitution, and debt dilution); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On 
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979) (analyzing 
the areas of conflict between bondholders and stockholders). 
90 See generally Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 
(1977). See also Anat R. Admati, et al., Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation 31-32 (Stanford Univ., 
Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper Series No. 114, 2012), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2031204. 
91 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 5 (2013), available 
at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004. 
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When shareholders are in control—either through a controlling share-
holder or well-organized blockholders, or through equity-incentivized manag-
ers—there is less reason to worry about shareholder–manager agency costs. 
But the downside of shareholder control is that the incentive to externalize 
risk onto creditors comes to the fore. That is why corporate law, especially 
in systems that empower shareholders or in which controlling shareholders 
are common, has traditionally been concerned with creditor protection. 
The interrelationship between the shareholder–manager and shareholder– 
creditor agency cost problems is well established theoretically and empiri-
cally in the finance literature. Teresa John and Kose John modeled the 
relationship between top-management compensation and capital structure.92 
In 1993, right around the time that high-powered equity incentives became 
standard features of management compensation and the “shareholder em-
powerment” movement began to pick up steam, they presciently observed 
that:  
It may be possible to fine tune the compensation structure to align manage-
rial incentives with shareholders interest, minimizing agency costs of equity. 
However, such a compensation structure would induce risk-shifting incen-
tives in the managers (i.e., when risky debt is outstanding, equity has a con-
vex payoff structure such that shareholders gain by shifting into higher risk 
projects even when the incremental net present value is negative; see Jensen 
and Meckling (1976)). A management compensation designed carefully to 
minimize the agency costs of equity may give rise to high agency costs of 
debt.93 
Empirically, as even an incomplete review of the evidence shows, it is 
now clear that increasing the alignment of managers and shareholders can 
have a significant effect on bondholders. Higher CEO equity incentives are 
associated with higher bond yields.94 The announcement of new option 
grants negatively impacts bond prices.95 Bond return premiums and mana-
gerial ownership are correlated.96 There is a positive relationship between 
 
92 See generally Teresa A. John & Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Struc-
ture, 48 J. FIN. 949 (1993). 
93 Id. at 951. 
94 Chenyang Wei, Covenant Protection, Credit Spread Dynamics and Managerial Incentives 
20 (Nov. 29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~cwei/Job 
Market_CovenantsSpreadCEOIncentive_ChenyangWei.pdf. 
95 Richard A. DeFusco, Robert R. Johnson & Thomas S. Zorn, The Effect of Executive Stock 
Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617, 622-25 (1990). 
96 Elizabeth Strock Bagnani et al., Managers, Owners, and the Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical 
Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 453, 461-64 (1994). 
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credit spreads and the Delta (the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price) 
and Vega (the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility) of a CEO’s total 
portfolio of stock and options.97  
Better alignment brought about by the presence of powerful shareholders 
has similar effects. Shareholder control (as proxied by the presence of 
greater-than-five-percent blockholders) can substantially increase bondholder 
risk (reflected in bond yields and credit ratings), especially when a firm is 
exposed to takeovers.98 The G index of shareholder rights developed by 
Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick99 is associated with higher 
cost of bank debt100 and higher bond yields.101 Even nonbinding shareholder 
proposals pushing for better pay-for-performance sensitivity are correlated 
with negative abnormal returns for bondholders, and the more leveraged the 
target company, the more negative the returns.102 
Which creditors does or should corporate law worry about? After all, 
creditors come in various forms, including senior secured creditors, bond-
holders, trade creditors, tort victims, and taxing authorities. In the first 
instance, just as the law ignores the heterogeneity of actual shareholders in 
analyzing shareholder–manager agency costs, so too it elides the differences 
among actual creditors because agency costs of any sort are costs, separate 
from who bears them. Second, the law often considers creditors as a group 
because they are a useful proxy for the wider nonshareholder social interests 
in firm success. Third, the extent to which creditors can protect themselves 
(and in so doing protect or not protect other creditors) is a complex question 
 
97 Naveen D. Daniel, J. Spencer Martin & Lalitha Naveen, The Hidden Cost of Managerial 
Incentives: Evidence from the Bond and Stock Markets 13-16 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=612921; Wei, supra note 94, at 8-10. 
98 See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Vinay B. Nair & Chenyang Wei, The Impact of Shareholder 
Governance on Bondholders 6-10 (June 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages. 
stern.nyu.edu/~cwei/The%20Impact%20of%20Shareholder%20Governance%20on%20Bondholders.
pdf (basing this finding on a sample from 1990 to 1997). 
99 See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 
Q.J. Econ. 107, 114-19 (2003) (describing the construction of the “Governance Index”). 
100 Sudheer Chava, Dmitry Livdan & Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Do Shareholder Rights Affect 
the Cost of Bank Loans? 26 (Maastricht Univ., EFA 2004, Paper No. 5061, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=495853. 
101 Mark S. Klock, Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell, Does Corporate Governance Matter 
to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 693, 708-09 & tbl.3 (2005). 
102 Steve Fortin et al., Are Bondholders Happy with Shareholder Proposals? An Empirical 
Examination of Pay-Performance Activism 29-32, 35-37 (Dec. 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975973. The authors also provide some evidence that targeted 
firms engage in more risk-taking behavior after such proposals, with an increase in volatility that 
explains the negative bond reaction. Id. at 32. 
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that depends on assumptions about the efficiency of contracting and of 
markets, and thus enters at a later stage of the analysis.  
III. ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER–
CREDITOR AGENCY COSTS 
As Marcel Kahan and I have argued elsewhere, a variety of strategies are 
employed to control agency problems in corporations, including contracts, 
compensation, governance structures, and legal rules.103 All of these strategies 
are used to control shareholder–creditor agency costs.104 Before examining the 
role of litigation in controlling residual agency costs, it is important to 
consider the various “adaptive mechanisms” by which shareholder–creditor 
agency costs are and can be controlled.  
A. The Contracting Strategy 
The first line of defense will predictably be contracts, as the conflict  
between shareholder and bondholder interests is well known to investors, 
even if not always appreciated by corporate law scholars. Moreover, as 
described above, there is compelling evidence that greater alignment of 
manager and shareholder interests exacerbates the shareholder–bondholder 
conflict. These conflicts are addressed in two ways: covenants in debt 
contracts and pricing. 
As described in Clifford Smith and Jerold Warner’s classic analysis, cov-
enants can be divided into a number of categories: restrictions on the firm’s 
production/investment policy (including restrictions on disposition of 
assets); restrictions on distributions (including restrictions on the payment 
of dividends, share purchases, and other forms of distribution); restrictions 
on subsequent financing (including limitations on issuing higher-priority 
debt and guarantees); modification of payoffs (including sinking funds, 
conversion rights, and callability); and bonding activities (including 
required reports, specification of accounting standards, and officer certifi-
cates of compliance). 105  Michael Bradley and Michael Roberts divide 
covenants up into somewhat different baskets: prepayment (covenants that 
mandate early retirement of the loan, conditional on some event such as a 
 
103 Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying, supra note 33, at 881-87; see also KRAAK-
MAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 39 tbl.2-1 (dividing strategies to protect principals into “ex ante” and 
“ex post,” and “regulatory” versus “governance,” yielding a total of ten different strategies). 
104 For a very good, short survey, see Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (Claire A. Hill & Brett 
H. McDonnell eds., 2012). 
105 See generally Smith & Warner, supra note 89. 
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security issuance or asset sale); financial (limits placed on the level of 
different accounting variables); dividend (covenants that restrict distribu-
tions to shareholders unless certain conditions are met); and secured debt 
(limiting issuance unless issued pari passu with existing secured debt, also 
called “negative pledge” covenants).106 As Smith and Warner argued, and 
others have argued since, many of these covenants can be understood as 
addressing various aspects of the shareholder–bondholder conflict. 
Covenants appear in both private and public debt contracts in differing 
degrees, due to the very different contracting environments.107 Private debt 
has relatively low costs of negotiation and, most importantly, renegotiation, 
because the number of parties is very small (often just borrower and 
lender). By contrast, public debt has very high costs of renegotiation. A 
straightforward transaction-cost analysis would correctly predict more 
intense contractual restrictions in private debt than in public debt.  
The importance of covenants in private debt is further accentuated by 
the relative proportions of public and private debt, with the overwhelming 
amount of debt financing coming from private and intermediated bank 
lending. According to Joel Houston and Christopher James, the mean 
percentage of public debt in their sample is 17% of total debt, with most 
firms relying on intermediated (including bank) debt exclusively.108 Bradley 
and Roberts confirm this in a much larger and more comprehensive sample, 
finding that between 1993 and 2001, private debt issuance was more than 
twice the amount of public debt, with most private debt consisting of 364-
day facilities, revolving loans, and term loans.109  
Consistent with the transaction cost view, private debt contains far more 
covenants than public debt. Bradley and Roberts find that, for each category 
of covenant, more than 70% of the private debt contracts they sampled 
 
106 Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt 
Covenants 11-12 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=466240. See generally Avner Kalay, Stockholder–Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J. 
FIN. ECON. 211 (1982) (examining dividend covenants to support the theory that bond covenants 
are structured to control the shareholder–bondholder conflict). 
107 For a full discussion of the institutional differences between private and public debt, see 
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance Structure for Corporate 
Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 452-69 (1999). On the importance of private debt and the power 
wielded by its holders, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1227-28 (2006). 
108 Joel Houston & Christopher James, Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of Private and 
Public Debt Claims, 51 J. FIN. 1863, 1871-73 & tbl.I (1996). 
109 Bradley & Roberts, supra note 106, at 8-9.  
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contain such a covenant.110 In public debt, by contrast, the incidence is never 
above 44%, and usually less than 25%.111 Moreover, between 1993 and 2001, 
the frequency of covenants addressing additional debt, equity, and asset 
sales has increased dramatically: from 18% to 81% (additional debt), 32% to 
94% (additional equity), and 25% to 75% (asset sales).112 By contrast, during 
the same period the frequency of covenants in public debt declined.113 
Not only are covenants very common, they also appear when expected. 
Ileen Malitz finds that the poorer a firm’s financial condition, the more 
likely its debt will include covenants: large firms are less likely to have 
covenants than small (and higher risk) firms and the greater a firm’s existing 
leverage, the more likely it is to have covenants in new debt.114 Similarly, 
firms that face higher shareholder–bondholder conflicts are more likely to 
include restrictive covenants in their debt.115 Robert Nash, Jeffry Netter, and 
Annette Poulsen find that high-growth firms are less likely to give up 
flexibility in financing (payment of dividends and issuance of debt) than 
lower-growth firms.116 Marcel Kahan and David Yermack show that firms 
with more investment opportunities are less likely to include restrictive 
covenants and prefer to control agency problems through the issuance of 
convertible debt.117  
The empirical evidence shows that creditor protection is priced in two 
senses: (1) creditor protection is associated with lower promised yields at 
issue; and (2) there is a significant negative relation between credit spreads 
and the degree of covenant protection, controlling for issuer and bond issue 
characteristics.118  
At issuance, many studies find a negative relationship between the ex 
ante pricing of debt and the presence of covenants.119 Indeed, pricing can be 
 
110 Id. at 13. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Ileen Malitz, On Financial Contracting: The Determinants of Bond Covenants, FIN. MGMT., 
Summer 1986, at 18, 22-23. 
115 See Joy Begley & Gerald A. Feltham, An Empirical Examination of the Relation Between 
Debt Contracts and Management Incentives, 27 J. ACCT. & ECON. 229, 243-44 (1999) (attributing 
restrictive covenants to the greater uncertainty faced by these firms). 
116 Robert C. Nash, Jeffry M. Netter & Annette B. Poulsen, Determinants of Contractual Rela-
tions Between Shareholders and Bondholders: Investment Opportunities and Restrictive Covenants, 9 J. 
CORP. FIN. 201, 229-30 (2003). 
117 Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities, 
14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 136, 149-51 (1998). 
118 Wei, supra note 94, at 13-18. 
119 See, e.g., Vidhan K. Goyal, Market Discipline of Bank Risk: Evidence From Subordinated Debt 
Contracts, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 318, 334 (2005); Natalia Reisel, On the Value of Restrictive 
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quite sensitive to differences among firms and issues of bonds. Chenyang 
Wei finds that, while “higher CEO risk-taking incentive is associated with 
higher credit spreads for bonds with low protection[,] . . . higher CEO risk-
taking incentive is associated with lower credit spreads for bonds with high 
protection.”120 In other words, investors seem willing to pay for covenants 
that control CEO risk-taking. Post issuance, Wei provides evidence that 
covenants also affect credit spreads. For example, in the face of industry-
wide or economy-wide shocks, bonds with strong covenant protection 
suffered substantially less than those with weak protection.121 
The conflict between shareholders and bondholders is particularly prom-
inent in LBOs. Thus, Arthur Warga and Ivo Welch show that, between 1985 
and 1989, bondholder losses after LBO announcements ranged on average 
between 6% and 7%.122 Lindsay Baran and Tao-Hsien Dolly King, in a study 
of a sample of 182 buyouts from 1981 to 2006, find that bondholders suffer 
substantial losses and that their losses are larger the bigger and more 
prominent the private equity player (proxied by market share).123 Interest-
ingly, bondholders fare worse in club deals than in acquisitions by a single 
private equity firm,124 perhaps because a group of private equity firms does 
not monitor a portfolio firm’s performance as effectively as does a single 
firm, or because they overpay, or both. The scope of their study allows 
Baran and King to show that the wealth-transfer effect was of significant 
magnitude through two separate buyout waves (the 1980s and the 2000s).125 
Creditors’ most powerful protection against loss from LBOs is a 
“Change in Control” (CIC) covenant that gives holders the right to sell the 
bond back to the issuer at a small premium to par upon a change in control. 
The use of CIC covenants has varied over time, usually in response to 
bondholder losses. Thus, Kenneth Lehn and Annette Poulsen show that 
event-risk covenants increased from 3% of newly issued bonds in 1986 to 
32% in 1989.126 Matthew Billett, Zhan Jiang, and Erik Lie find that, in the 
 
Covenants: An Empirical Investigation of Public Bond Issues 5-7 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=644522. 
120 Wei, supra note 94, at 4 (emphasis added). 
121 Id. at 18-20. 
122 Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 
959, 979 (1993). 
123 Lindsay C. Baran & Tao-Hsien Dolly King, Going Private Transactions, Bondholder Returns, 
and Wealth Transfer Effects, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 1856, 1861 (2010). 
124 Id. at 1864. 
125 Id. at 1870-72. 
126  Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Contractual Resolution of Bondholder–Stockholder  
Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, 34 J.L. & ECON. 645, 662 tbl.1 (1991). 
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1980s, only 13% of bond issues had CIC covenants, rising to 31% in the 1990s 
and 41% in the 2000s.127 Because issuers often have multiple series of bonds, 
the percentage of issuers with CIC covenants in any bond can also be 
relevant, at least when the covenant is in a significant percentage of the 
outstanding bond principal. Billett, Jiang, and Lie also find that, between 
1985 and 1987, fewer than 3% of bonds had CIC covenants.128 By contrast, 
during 1989–2006, 13-33% had such covenants.129 Focusing on the 2000s 
LBO wave, the authors find that 41% had CIC covenants, compared to 57% 
of a control sample of non-LBO firms.130 Wei finds similar variance in the 
incidence of CIC provisions in public bonds: 0% for 1980–1984, 20.3% for 
1985–1989, 25.9% for 1990–1994, 46.8% for 1995–1999, and 42.4% for 2000–
2003.131 Moreover, riskier debt is more likely to have CIC protections, which 
is consistent with an expectation that riskier debt is more likely to be 
expropriated in takeovers.132  
There is substantial evidence that CIC covenants are effective in pro-
tecting bondholders from loss, at least in some market conditions. Baran 
and King find that holders of bonds with a CIC covenant trading at a 
discount enjoy significant gains in buyouts.133 Billett, Jiang, and Lie, using 
bond-pricing data from the 2000s, find losses to bondholders without CIC 
covenants but gains to bonds with such covenants.134 The differences are 
significant: bonds without CIC covenants lose, on average, 6.8%, while 
those with CIC protection gain 2.3%—a swing of around 9%.135 
Given the richness of the contractual resources for constraining share-
holder opportunism, is contracting alone sufficient? Mark Roe and Federico 
Venezze concisely summarize the limits of a pure contractarian approach to 
debtor–creditor relationships: contracts are incomplete (and necessarily so, 
because of the impossibility of fully specifying state-contingent contracts) 
and must be interpreted; courts will be called upon to determine the extent 
to which a party is behaving opportunistically and going beyond what con-
tract terms permit; and contracts between the debtor and a creditor or class of 
creditors will not adequately protect other parties whose information and 
 
127 Matthew T. Billett, Zhan Jiang & Erik Lie, The Effect of Change-in-Control Covenants on 
Takeovers: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 6 tbl.2 (2010). 
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131 Wei, supra note 94, at tbl.II.  
132 Billett, Jiang & Lie, supra note 127, at 9. 
133 Baran & King, supra note 123, at 1861. 
134 Billett, Jiang & Lie, supra note 127, at 11. 
135 Id. If, because of interest-rate shifts, bonds are trading at a premium, a CIC covenant 
requiring the firm to buy back the bonds would not protect bondholders from loss. 
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collective action problems limit their ability to self-protect.136 Finally, boom 
and bust credit cycles pose challenges: despite experience with the unfortu-
nate consequences of inadequate protection, we witness the puzzling but 
recurring phenomenon of “covenant lite” or “no covenant” lending during 
periods of credit-market exuberance. It is not easy for a contractarian to 
explain why, when money is cheap, investors are willing to give it away 
without adequate protection.137 
B. The Compensation Strategy 
As described above, the rise of equity-based compensation is a large part 
of the story of how we controlled the manager–shareholder agency cost 
problem. However, incentivizing managers to think like shareholders 
intensifies the shareholder–creditor problem. Compensation structures 
seem to be part of the problem; fortunately, they can also be part of the 
solution. 
Jensen and Meckling’s original analysis suggested that the shareholder–
creditor agency cost problem could be eliminated if executive compensation 
mirrored the debt–equity capital structure of the firm:  
 We have been asked why debt held by the manager (i.e., “inside debt”) 
plays no role in our analysis. We have as yet been unable to incorporate this 
dimension formally into our analysis in a satisfactory way. The question is a 
good one and suggests some potentially important extensions of the analysis. 
For instance, it suggests an inexpensive way for the owner-manager with 
both equity and debt outstanding to eliminate a large part (perhaps all) of 
the agency costs of debt. If he binds himself contractually to hold a fraction 
of the total debt equal to his fractional ownership of the total equity he would 
have no incentive whatsoever to reallocate wealth from the debt holders to 
the stockholders.138 
 
136 Mark J. Roe & Federico Cenzi Venezze, A Capital Market, Corporate Law Approach to Cred-
itor Conduct 21-23 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 12-34, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103217.  
137 For an interesting analysis, see Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and 
Contract Design: Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51 (2013), which suggests that 
changes in market conditions affect the usage and nature of covenants. 
138 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 352 (footnote omitted). 
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Jensen and Meckling’s comments on optimal compensation structures, 
which lay fallow for many years, were recently formalized and explored by 
Alex Edmans and Qi Liu.139  
Others have also explored the properties of inside debt. Rangarajan 
Sundaram and David Yermack find that, when managers hold large inside-
debt positions, the firm’s likelihood of becoming insolvent is reduced.140 
Chenyang Wei and David Yermack, exploiting the better data now available 
on executive pensions and deferred compensation, explore investors’ 
reactions to initial disclosures of CEOs’ inside debt levels (i.e., pensions 
and deferred compensation).141 Other work shows that a firm can borrow at 
a lower cost when its CEO has a large amount of inside debt, compared to 
inside equity, and that fewer bond covenants are observed when the CEO 
receives a larger portion of his compensation in pension benefits (a form of 
debt).142  
Fred Tung, building on some of this literature, has argued for linking 
bank executives’ compensation more directly to both equity and subordinated 
debt issued by the bank subsidiary of a bank holding company.143 Some of 
the other proposals for restructuring banker pay, such as requiring that 
 
139 See generally Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75 (2011) (advocating for 
the inclusion of inside debt in executive compensation). 
140 See Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role 
in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1583 (2007) (concluding that CEOs manage more 
conservatively when their personal debt-to-equity ratios are higher than their firms’). 
141 See generally Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt  
Incentives (NYU Stern Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. FIN-09-020, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1519252 (finding that, upon disclosure, equity prices fall and 
debt values rise, while volatility falls for both). 
142 Wei and Yermack provide a good summary of the findings: 
Several recent working papers . . . generally find that, in many settings, firms face 
a lower cost of debt when the CEO has a high ratio of inside debt to inside equity 
compensation . . . . Chava, Kumar and Warga (2010) find a lower incidence of 
bond covenants when CEOs receive more of their compensation in the form of a 
pension, the largest type of inside debt. Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2010) study 
how inside debt can reduce risk-taking by bank CEOs and find event study evidence 
similar to ours, with a bank’s credit default swap spreads becoming more narrow 
when it discloses large pension and deferred compensation holdings by its manage-
ment. A related paper by Tung and Wang (2010) concludes that bank CEOs with 
large amounts of inside debt compensation exposed their firms to less risk and as a 
result performed better during the crisis. 
Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted). 
143 See Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk 
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1245-47 (2011) (arguing that compensating bankers with 
subordinated debt would provide clearer signals and incentives). 
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managers hold shares for several years after leaving the firm,144 may provide 
the same sort of alignment.  
The virtues of including both debt and equity in managers’ compensa-
tion contracts extend beyond the regulated financial institution sector. By 
including both elements, a compensation contract can help control the 
distortion in incentives created by relying exclusively on one or the other. 
Debt holdings temper managers’ willingness to risk bankruptcy as the value 
of equity drops towards zero; equity incentivizes managers to increase firm 
value.  
A key design question for mixed equity–debt executive compensation is 
the degree to which contracts must mirror firms’ capital structure in order 
to control shareholder–creditor opportunism, and what the resulting costs 
to firms might be.145 This is important because a firm’s capital structure 
changes over time—in some cases quite dramatically. The existing research 
suggests that even a crude mix of equity (through stock and option owner-
ship) and debt (through deferred compensation and pension benefits) can 
have powerful effects on the likelihood of bankruptcy and the cost of 
credit.146 There are a wide variety of ways to introduce debt into incentive 
compensation, including the use of credit default swaps.147 
C. The Governance Strategy 
In an important article, Doug Baird and Bob Rasmussen focus on the 
corporate governance structures created by the extensive rights given to 
senior creditors in complex lending agreements:  
 The presence of such an institutional lender fundamentally alters corpo-
rate governance. The lending agreement contains many affirmative and neg-
ative covenants that give the lender de facto control over every aspect of the 
business. Moreover, the complete control the lender has over the debtor’s 
cash flow gives the lender veto power over every course of action, whether 
 
144 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1915, 1925-28 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 n.3 (2010); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compen-
sation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term 6-9 (Yale Program for Studies in Law, Econ. & 
Pub. Policy, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 374, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1336978. 
145 For a very good and accessible summary, see Alex Edmans, How to Fix Executive Compen-
sation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2012, at R1. 
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147 See, e.g., Hans Bystrom, Executive Compensation Based on Asset Values, 32 ECON. BULL. 
1504, 1505 (2012). 
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internal to the corporation or outside it. Decisions normally reserved for 
directors and stockholders—such as whether to sell a division, change the 
business plan, or replace the managers—require the lender’s explicit bless-
ing. Trip wires are tied to the performance of the business and its discrete 
units, and a general provision gives the lender the ability to call the loan in 
the event of any material adverse change. The purpose of these trip wires is 
not to force repayment of the loan, but rather to ensure that lenders have 
control over major decisions and the ability to insist on changes in man-
agement when the business encounter reverses.148 
Baird and Rasmussen, taking the conventional view of corporate governance 
as focused on controlling shareholder–manager agency costs, analyze the 
various ways in which private lenders are able to constrain managerial 
agency costs when the firm runs aground.  
Relax their assumption that the conventional story is right, and consider 
the implications of the developments summarized earlier. If, as I argue, the 
shareholder–manager agency cost problem has been substantially replaced 
by a shareholder–creditor agency cost problem, the subtle and complex 
features of “debt governance” described by Baird and Rasmussen can be 
understood as constraining attempts by shareholders and their loyal manag-
ers to take advantage of creditors. Indeed, this understanding is bolstered by 
the triggering structure: the senior lenders’ governance rights primarily 
come into play when the firm encounters financial distress—when the risk 
of shareholder–creditor opportunism comes to the fore. Moreover, the 
rough timing of the evolution of debt governance described by Baird and 
Rasmussen fits my story well. They trace the development of private-debt 
governance to Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 and revised Article 9 
(effective 2001), which increased a senior lender’s ability to secure a debt 
with all current and later-acquired corporate assets.149 As such, their story is 
a story of the 1990s and 2000s, the periods during which, the evidence 
 
148 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 107, at 1227-28 (footnote omitted). For an earlier analysis 
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described above shows, the shareholder–manager agency cost problem was 
substantially brought under control.150 
IV. GRAPPLING WITH RESIDUAL SHAREHOLDER– 
CREDITOR AGENCY COSTS 
In the eighty years since Berle and Means posed the question, endless 
variants of the shareholder–manager agency cost problem have been 
analyzed. What do contemporary shareholder–creditor conflicts look like, 
now that managers largely think like shareholders and the world has at least 
partially adapted? In earlier parts, I examined ways in which the sharehold-
er–creditor conflict is controlled by incentives, contracts, and governance. In 
this Part, I want to explore the available legal resources for controlling two 
residual shareholder–creditor conflicts that strike me as illustrative. The 
first type of conflict is a “last period problem,” illustrated by the rapid 
failures of some gigantic 2007 LBOs. The second type of conflict, illustrated 
by the recent battle at Dynegy, involves attempts by shareholders and 
shareholder-oriented managers to exploit complex corporate subsidiary 
structures to wrest value away from creditors during financial distress.151 As 
we will see, the same set of doctrinal resources, in different measures, can 
respond to both challenges. My interest in these case studies is to examine 
the tools available and how those tools interact with each other in control-
ling what seem to be examples of shareholder–creditor opportunism.  
A. A Failed LBO 
 Background legal rules both support contracting and act as a backstop to 
prevent fraud and opportunism. To get a sense of the role of these funda-
mental legal rules, consider the following hypothetical. This hypothetical, 
inspired by some of the failed LBOs of 2007 to 2008,152 is designed to 
 
150 Creditor governance of the sort described by Baird and Rasmussen raises the specter of 
“lender liability.” Roe and Venezze present an interesting “corporate law” approach to the legal 
treatment of creditor governance that has the potential to provide more certainty to creditors in 
controlling management behavior during financial distress, which is desirable in a world in which 
managers think like shareholders. See Roe & Venezze, supra note 136, at 19-20 (applying the 
corporate law doctrines of entire fairness review and business judgment deference to the creditor 
context).  
151 For an in-depth analysis of one example of this type of conflict, see generally Richard 
Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (2011).  
152 See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the 
Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 124 
(2011) (“There has recently been a surge in fraudulent transfer litigation.”). The authors go on to 
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provide a best-case scenario for legal intervention in which some of the 
behavior verges on fraud. 
*      *      * 
Target Corp. is being sold at a very high price in a highly leveraged buy-
out. Target’s senior managers have substantial equity stakes through owner-
ship of stock and options, as well as “inside debt” through deferred 
compensation and pension benefits. They plan to cash out and devote 
themselves to recreational activities once the sale closes. In the course of the 
sale process, they have directed the preparation of new projections that, to 
an impartial eye, would be found to be wildly optimistic or even fraudulent. 
The board knows that the juiced projections were prepared for the market-
ing effort, that they have minimal foundation, and that the buyers and their 
financing banks have been relying upon them without realizing just how 
juiced they are.  
Suppose that, on the eve of approving the highly leveraged sale, or on 
the eve of the closing, Target’s bankers tell Target’s board that, as soon as the 
deal closes, the company will be insolvent, leaving some of the existing 
creditors unpaid. “Given the price that Buyer is paying for the shares, the 
amount of debt it is putting on the company, and the likely cash flow,” say 
the bankers in a moment of candor, “there is no way it’ll survive.” 
May the board, consistent with its duties, go forward with the deal? 
Suppose they were to do so, and the company fails shortly after closing; do 
the directors face any liability? Given that Target shareholders are thrilled 
with the price and will exit in the sale, must the board go forward with the 
deal? Should it choose not to, will it face any liability to Target shareholders?  
*      *      * 
Before turning to the legal treatment of this hypothetical, consider how 
it could slip through the web of adaptive constraints described above 
(contracting, compensation, and governance) and harm pre-LBO unsecured 
creditors (as well as employees, communities, suppliers, and customers). 
Existing senior lenders will be largely indifferent so long as they are paid 
 
state, “There have already been several major cases brought and the data suggest that there are far 
more in store.” Id. at 124 n.11 (citing 3V Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
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part, 680 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012); Tribune Media Servs., Inc. v. Beatty (In re Tribune Co.), 418 
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back at closing. The new banks financing the LBO can be expected to 
recognize the misaligned incentives of selling managers and to conduct due 
diligence to assure themselves that the post-LBO company will be solvent 
(especially given the threat of a fraudulent conveyance challenge, as dis-
cussed below). There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of due dili-
gence in protecting pre-LBO creditors, given the fundamental asymmetry 
of information between sellers and buyers. For bondholders, change-in-
control covenants would have protected them, but during some periods of 
the business cycle, bonds are issued with minimal protection. Managers’ 
financial incentives created by compensation structures are unlikely to 
protect creditors when the company is being sold and managers are exiting. 
Finally, private debt’s governance levers will come in to play only after the 
firm is in financial distress.  
Consider, now, how this failed-LBO hypothetical would be analyzed 
under U.S. law.153 In appraising the adequacy of current U.S. approaches, it 
is worth keeping in mind Bayless Manning’s summary of the core creditor-
protection goals of corporate law: 
If the hierarchical relationship of creditor to shareholder is to have any 
meaning at all, then the management must not be left free to shovel all the 
assets in the corporate treasury out to the shareholders when the corpora-
tion has insufficient assets to pay its creditors or when the shareholder dis-
tribution renders the corporation unable to pay its creditors. The central 
point is to avoid insolvency.154 
1. The Bankruptcy Approach: Fraudulent Conveyance 
A large number of failed LBOs end up in bankruptcy courts. When this 
occurs, three categories of claims are often asserted: claims under the 
Bankruptcy Code to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations and to 
recover amounts transferred; actions to subordinate the claims of the LBO-
financing parties to the claims of pre-LBO creditors; and state law claims 
against the parties who effectuated or participated in the transaction, 
including breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duties, unjust enrichment, and recovery of illegal distributions.155 
 
153 For a brief analysis under U.K. law, see infra text accompanying notes 349-364.  
154 BAYLESS MANNING WITH JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 63 (3d ed. 1990). 
155 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 152, at 97-126 (including these types of counts); see also 2 
Report of Kenneth N. Klee, Examiner at 4-5, In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (KJC) (Bankr. D. 
Del. July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Klee Report] (detailing the three claims categories).  
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Typically, the magnitude of the LBO debt—which occupies a senior  
position—will dwarf other claims. As a result, if the LBO debt remains 
senior, the LBO creditors will recover on all the claims asserted (including 
claims against themselves, for example, for aiding and abetting). On the 
other hand, if the pre-LBO creditors are able to avoid the LBO debt (or 
have it subordinated), they will move to the head of the line. Together, 
these considerations make the actions to avoid the LBO debt the “main 
event,” in comparison to which everything else fades into the background.156 
a.  The Basic Theory 
The outlines of the fraudulent transfer approach to an LBO track the 
language of the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer provision § 548(b) 
and the parallel incorporation of state fraudulent transfer law through  
§ 544(b).157 There are several elements to the analysis.  
First, there is the question of what can be avoided. Under § 548, the 
bankruptcy trustee may avoid any “transfer . . . of an interest of the 
debtor in property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that was 
made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the 
petition.”158 In the LBO context, there are two principal potential applica-
tions of this provision: the transfer of cash by the Target firm to its share-
holders, and the Target’s obligation to repay the banks who financed the 
transaction. 
Second, there is the question of the circumstances under which transfers or 
obligations can be avoided. Under § 548, there are two separate possibilities. 
First, transfers or obligations may be avoided when they were incurred 
“with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the 
debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or 
such obligation was incurred, indebted.”159 This is the “actual fraud” or 
“intentional fraudulent transfer” prong, and it focuses on the transferor’s 
 
156 See Klee Report, supra note 155, at 4-10 (outlining potential actions to avoid and recover, 
comprising this “main event”). 
157 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(b) (2006). Section 548 generally parallels the structure of state 
law fraudulent transfer statutes and will be the focus of my discussion. 
158 Id. § 548(a)(1). State fraudulent transfer law, although overlapping with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s provision, may not be entirely duplicative. For example, the “reach-back” period may vary. 
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1309(1), (2) (2005) (allowing for a reach-back period of four 
years).  
159 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
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intent and knowledge.160 The effect of a transfer is generally taken to be 
indicative of intent.161  
Alternatively, transfers or obligations incurred may be avoided if the 
debtor, voluntarily or involuntarily, “received less than a reasonably equiva-
lent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation”162 and, also, was either 
“insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was 
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation,”163 or 
“was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in busi-
ness or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was 
an unreasonably small capital.”164 This is the “constructive fraud” prong. 
Because of the difficulties and uncertainty involved with proving intentional 
fraudulent transfer, the constructive fraudulent transfer prong is generally 
used to challenge failed LBOs.165 
Each of the elements of the constructive fraud approach must be satis-
fied. The first can be applied straightforwardly to the LBO context. Bank-
ruptcy courts and doctrines commonly seek to focus on “substance” rather 
than “form” and are thus open to collapsing the various steps of the transac-
tion, in appropriate circumstances. In determining whether to collapse the 
transactions, courts in the Third Circuit (most relevant because Delaware is 
in the Third Circuit) consider three factors: “First, whether all of the 
parties involved had knowledge of the multiple transactions. Second, 
whether each transaction would have occurred on its own. And third, 
whether each transaction was dependent or conditioned on other transac-
tions.”166 In the typical LBO—where each piece closes simultaneously and is 
mutually dependent, and where each participant knows how the transaction 
 
160 Klee Report, supra note 155, at 16. 
161 See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1305 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“[A] party is deemed to have intended the natural consequences of his acts.” (emphasis added)); see 
also Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1075 (3d Cir. 1992) (“In Tabor Court Realty 
Corp. we relied in part on the principle that ‘a party is deemed to have intended the natural 
consequences of his acts’ in upholding the district court's finding of intentional fraud.”). 
162 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i). 
163 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I). 
164 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II).  
165 See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1064. 
166 Mervyn’s L.L.C. v. Lubert-Adler Grp. IV, L.L.C. (In re Mervyn's Holdings, L.L.C.), 426 
B.R. 488, 497 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (citations omitted); see also The Liquidation Trust of 
Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Fin. Grp. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del.), 327 B.R. 
537, 547 (D. Del. 2005) (“Each step of the Transaction would not have occurred on its own, as each 
relied on additional steps to fulfill the parties’ intent and merge . . . .”). For a full discussion of 
the case law, and whether bad faith must be shown to justify collapsing, see Klee Report, supra note 
155, at 86-90. 
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is structured (if for no other reason than that it will be disclosed in the 
proxy statement)—these conditions will routinely be satisfied. 
Consider first the payments to the shareholders. If one views the LBO 
as a distribution to shareholders that does not benefit Target, then it looks 
clearly to be at an undervalue. The corporation receives no benefit from 
receiving its shares back from its shareholders, as that does not bring any 
capital into the firm, and does not allow it to invest in any projects. Turning 
to the obligations incurred to the banks that financed the LBO, once the 
steps of the transaction are collapsed, and proceeds of the loan have been 
paid out to shareholders, it is hard to see how Target has received “equiva-
lent value.”  
The second element of constructive fraud requires that the transfer or 
obligation incurred have occurred when the firm was or was rendered 
“insolvent” according to one of the two standard measures of insolvency: 
balance sheet insolvency (liabilities exceed assets) or some version of an 
“equity insolvency” test such as the one contained in § 548—that is, “en-
gaged in business . . . for which any property remaining with the debtor 
was an unreasonably small capital” or “intended to incur, or believed that 
the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor’s ability to 
pay as such debts matured.”167 In the LBO context, this becomes the domain 
of expert financial testimony and is obviously fact-specific. The key ques-
tion under any of the solvency tests is whether at the time of the transfer or 
obligation incurred, the firm was or became insolvent.168  
b. Is the Current Framework Sufficient? Some Doubts About  
Exclusive Reliance on Fraudulent Transfer Law 
When fraudulent conveyance law was first applied to failed LBOs, it was 
controversial and seemed to many to be a poor fit.169 Over time, fraudulent 
conveyance law has come to play an important role in bankruptcy cases. 
That said, from a corporate law perspective, it still seems odd that anyone 
would want fraudulent conveyance law to be the exclusive or even the 
primary framework for litigation over failed LBOs. While one could argue 
that we do not want managers to have multiple masters, and that the most 
 
167 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). See generally Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 152. 
168 Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i), the trustee may completely avoid any constructively 
fraudulent transfer. This is in contrast to §§ 548(c) and 550(a) where the avoidance is limited to 
the extent the debtor received less than equivalent value. 
169 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its 
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 852 (1985) (“A firm that incurs obligations in the course of 
a buyout does not seem at all like the Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to his brother for a 
pittance.”). 
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efficient structure is to have managers act in the shareholders’ interest and 
for LBO lenders to act in their own interests (and indirectly the interests of 
other creditors) by constraining the LBO sponsor, I am unconvinced. As I 
discuss below, the “single master” argument seems to exacerbate sharehold-
er–creditor agency costs at precisely the critical moment. Further, it implies 
that directors should, or even must, approve my hypothetical LBO even 
when they know that it will render the firm insolvent, as it is indisputably in 
shareholders’ interests to do so.170  
First, to the extent that the core “creditor protection” goal is, as Man-
ning puts it, that “management must not be left free to shovel all the assets 
in the corporate treasury out to the shareholders when the corporation has 
insufficient assets to pay its creditors or when the shareholder distribution 
itself renders the corporation unable to pay its creditors,”171 focusing on the 
lenders rather than on the managers is to ignore the key actors. Even if the 
LBO lenders are aware that the transaction is a single unified transaction in 
which debt is being substituted for equity, they are neither the initiating 
parties, nor the actors with fiduciary duties to the corporation or with direct 
access to the relevant information, including projections. Indeed, because of 
competition with other lenders, it is likely that they are lending at market 
rates. The real justification for imposing obligations on them, backed by the 
threat of losing priority to older creditors in bankruptcy, seems to be to 
recruit them to force the LBO sponsors and the Target firm to adopt a 
sound financial structure.172  
To one steeped in Delaware’s approach to corporate law—and to those 
with knowledge of how the same set of problems is handled in other 
corporate law systems—it is surprising that the analysis does not focus on 
the directors’ decision to approve a transaction that distributes funds to the 
shareholders ahead of the creditors and results in the bankruptcy of the 
company.  
Second, to impose liability on the LBO lenders is, in effect, to penalize 
some creditors for not adequately looking out for other creditors. This is in 
 
170 See infra text accompanying notes 234-236. 
171 MANNING, supra note 154, at 63. 
172 In so doing, it is analogous to imposing successorship liability in products liability cases as 
a way of forcing selling firms to make adequate provision for tort victims. See generally Edward B. 
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 203 (1993). 
  
1946 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1907 
tension with the general principle that creditors do not have duties to look 
out for the interests of other creditors.173  
Third, the fraudulent transfer model—in focusing on the transferor and 
the transferee—would seem to demand that the transferee return the 
improper transfer. In the LBO context, that would require the shareholders 
to return the amounts received for their shares. Yet, in a world of inter-
mediaries and custodial holding of securities, unwinding securities transac-
tions can pose systemic risks. As a result, the Bankruptcy Code contains a 
broad limitation on avoidance powers that can be exercised on behalf of a 
bankruptcy estate when a transfer is a “settlement payment.”174 This provi-
sion has been interpreted very broadly as barring the avoidance of LBO 
shareholder payments for claims asserted under § 548 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, other than those made with actual fraudulent intent.175 Given the 
complexities of clawing back payments made to dispersed shareholders, 
corporate law’s strategy of providing directors with incentives not to make 
such payments in the first place makes sense. 
Fourth, the heavy reliance on the fraudulent transfer framework has 
meant that a variety of cases that pose issues at the heart of corporate law’s 
creditor-protection function—that could provide the grist for the common 
law mill—do not do so. With bankruptcy focused primarily on priority, 
directors’ duties receive relatively little attention. At the same time, far less 
typical fact patterns—the creditor-regarding duty cases that actually arise in 
Delaware—become the basis upon which these duties are developed. This is 
not just a lost opportunity. It also distorts the development of doctrine and 
provides directors with a misleading and incomplete role description. 
In the early 1980s, when management buyouts (MBO) first emerged in 
significant numbers, directors were confused about their duties.176 Some 
thought their duty was to decide between the management group’s offer to 
buy the company and remaining independent. In a line of decisions, the 
 
173 See Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20  
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (1991) (“A creditor has to care about whether the debtor will pay it back, not 
whether the debtor will pay back anyone else.”).  
174 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006). 
175 See, e.g., Brandt v. B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int’l Corp.), 590 F.3d 252, 257-59 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (LBO of private corporation); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 
571 F.3d 545, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 
986 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 
505, 516 (3d Cir. 1999) (LBO of public corporation). But see Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. 
(In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996) (declining to apply § 546(e) to LBO 
payments). 
176 See generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1997) (describing the evolution of directors’ duties through MBO case law). 
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Delaware courts ultimately made it clear that that was not the right way to 
think about what, in essence, would be a decision to sell the company. 
Rather, Delaware courts made it clear that directors in MBOs must allow 
some sort of “market test” before selling the company to the management 
group. Board practices changed.  
There seems to be an analogous misunderstanding of directors’ duties 
with regard to highly leveraged transactions. There needs to be an analo-
gous reorientation of directors’ perceptions. Although the injunction to 
“maximize shareholder value” is a decent shorthand description of directors’ 
duties during normal times, it gives the wrong message when the means of 
maximizing shareholder value—highly leveraged transactions—threaten the 
company with insolvency. As discussed below, because of the oddities of our 
judicial architecture, we do not have the same intensity of judicial attention, 
and that lack has led to insufficient attention in the case law specifying 
directors’ duties. 
2. Delaware Corporate Law Doctrines 
With most of the fallout from failed LBOs playing out in the bankruptcy 
courts and targeting LBO lenders, it is not surprising that corporate law 
doctrines and remedies have remained at the margins.177 To the extent that 
corporate law will adapt to the reappearance of the shareholder–creditor 
 
177 Thus, in the bankruptcy cases, discussions of both fiduciary duty and improper distribu-
tion theories typically appear only after the main discussion of fraudulent transfer theories against 
the various defendants. In In re Buckhead America Corp., which contains the fullest discussion of 
these theories, their analysis comes only after discussions of the fraudulent transfer claims (Section 
B), tortious interference (Section C), and “other claims relating to indentures” (Section D), before 
the final section that discusses the “alter ego theory of liability.” Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 
B.R. 956, 961-75 (D. Del. 1994); see also Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc. v. Lewis, 129 B.R. 992, 
1000-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (improper distribution); Weiboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 
488, 511-12 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 584-85 
(M.D. Pa. 1983) (majority shareholder duty), aff ’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. 
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Similarly, the theories appear in court-appointed examiners’ reports in a somewhat marginal 
way. Thus, in Barry Zaretsky’s seminal report in the Revco bankruptcy, Report of Barry Zaretsky, 
Examiner at 117-24, In re Revco D.S., Inc., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2966 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 
1990) (Nos. 588-1308 to 588-1321, 588-1305, 588-1761 to 588-1812, 588-1820), he discussed claims 
under Delaware General Corporate Law sections 160 and 174, but relatively late in the report. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 174 (2011) (corporation’s voting and ownership powers, and 
director liability, respectively). Likewise, in Kenneth Klee’s four-volume examiner’s report in the 
Tribune bankruptcy, the improper distribution claims do not appear until near the end of the 
second volume. See Klee Report, supra note 155, at 406. 
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agency cost problem, these doctrines will form the starting point—the 
“doctrinal resources” for addressing this new–old problem.  
Restrictions on distributions to shareholders, whether through share 
repurchases or dividends, have a long and complicated history.178 Before 
turning to the restrictions and liabilities under Delaware law, it is important 
to understand how these types of rules work. There are two kinds of legal 
tools for restricting distributions: limits on the sources of distributions and 
limits on the effects of distributions. Generally, three factors enter into the 
determination: the corporation’s cash flow, its earnings, and its net assets.179  
The traditional limitation on the source of distributions is that they 
must be out of “surplus,” a term of art.180 There are two ideas behind this 
restriction. First, distributions should not be made to shareholders when the 
firm already owes more money to creditors and preferred shareholders than 
its assets are worth. Second, at least a portion of the equity capital is 
committed for the life of the firm and provides a cushion to protect credi-
tors and others dealing with the firm. This cushion must thus be protected 
from distributions to shareholders. Although this class of restrictions is 
often referred to as a “balance sheet solvency test,” it is quite different from 
true accounting-based tests, and the “balance sheet” need not be prepared 
according to GAAP.181 
How the “balance sheet insolvency” test is implemented has changed 
over time and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In contrast to the 
Model Business Code, Delaware takes a very traditional approach to 
restricting distributions. Under Delaware law, dividends and share repur-
chases can be funded out of “surplus,” which is defined as the amount of 
“net assets” in excess of “capital.”182 “Net assets” is defined as the amount by 
which total assets exceed total liabilities.183 “Stated capital” cannot be less 
than the “par value” of all shares with “par value,” but may be more, at the 
board’s discretion.184 If shares are issued without par value, as is permitted 
under Delaware law, the board will determine at the time of issue what 
portion will be considered “capital.”185  
 
178 For the leading account, see BAYLESS MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL, supra note 154. 
179 BARBARA BLACK, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS AND STOCK REPURCHASES §§ 1:3, 6:4 
(2004). 
180 For a classic discussion of the concept of “surplus” and the confusion it engenders, see 
MANNING, supra note 154, at 74-78. 
181 BLACK, supra note 179, § 1:3. 
182 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
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A board may thus repurchase shares or pay dividends so long as total 
assets are greater than total liabilities plus capital.186 When the market 
values of the assets and/or liabilities differ from the book value, the board 
may revalue the assets and liabilities (upward or downward) on the basis of 
such information as it considers reliable, with no specific method mandated 
by the courts.187  
The second type of limitation on distributions to shareholders looks not 
at the source of distributions but at their effect on creditors. These are 
known as “equity insolvency tests” and focus on the corporation’s cash flow. 
Here, the idea is to prohibit distributions when the corporation is unable to 
pay its debts as they come due, or would be rendered unable by the distribu-
tion.188 Thus, for example, the Model Business Code provides, “No distri-
bution may be made if, after giving it effect: (1) the corporation would not 
be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of busi-
ness . . . .”189 Although Delaware’s statutes do not contain “equity insol-
vency” limitations, the case law does, as I discuss below. 
Before turning to the application of Delaware doctrine, recall exactly 
what an LBO is. An LBO is an acquisition of a target company, through any 
of a variety of different structures, in which a significant portion of the 
purchase price is borrowed, with the loan ultimately secured by the assets of 
the target company.190 Although there are a host of alternative structures 
available, the reverse triangular merger has become the standard approach 
for LBOs in the United States. To illustrate briefly, Buyer establishes an 
acquisition shell, NewCo, and, if a toehold position is desired, NewCo 
acquires it. After reaching terms with Target, NewCo merges with Target, 
with Target as the surviving corporation, and with Target’s shareholders 
receiving cash for their shares. Simultaneously at closing, funds are bor-
rowed from Lender to pay Target’s shareholders, secured by Target’s 
 
186 Id. § 170(a)(1). 
187 Delaware also provides for “nimble dividends.” “In case there shall be no such surplus, [a 
company may declare and pay dividends] out of its net profits for the fiscal year in which the 
dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year.” Id. § 170(a), (a)(2). The idea behind this 
type of provision is that a troubled firm must be able to promise dividends to new equity if it is to 
issue stock and stave off failure. 
188 BLACK, supra note 179, § 1:3. 
189 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (2008). 
190 See David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73, 81-83 (1985) 
(describing various ways to structure an LBO). 
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assets.191 In order to complete the transaction, Target’s board must recom-
mend it and Target’s shareholders must approve it.  
The creditor protection issue in an LBO is clear: debt is substituted for 
equity. Target’s shareholders are bought out, potentially leaving Target’s 
pre-LBO creditors high and dry, with none of the proceeds of the loans 
(secured by Target’s assets) invested in Target projects. LBOs thus raise the 
specter of “asset dilution”—the siphoning off of assets to the shareholders, 
leaving creditors worse off. 
a. Theory I: The Delaware Limitations on Share Repurchases 
Given what LBOs do, it is reasonable to view them as share repurchases. 
As noted above, Delaware adopts a “balance sheet insolvency” limitation on 
share repurchases. Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 
160(a) provides (in relevant part): 
Every corporation may purchase, redeem, receive, take or otherwise acquire, 
own and hold, sell, lend, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, pledge, 
use and otherwise deal in and with its own shares; provided, however, that 
no corporation shall:  
1) Purchase or redeem its own shares of capital stock for cash or other 
property when the capital of the corporation is impaired or when such 
purchase or redemption would cause any impairment of the capital of the 
corporation . . . .192  
 
191 As Carlson points out, there are numerous alternative modes of structuring the acquisi-
tion, all with the same outcome. Id. at 83. Modifying Carlson’s description slightly, all of the 
following structures produce similar results, although they may have different legal consequences: 
 Newcorp borrows from Lender and simultaneously uses the proceeds to purchase 
Target’s stock, which is pledged to secure the loan. 
 Newcorp borrows from Lender, uses the proceeds to buy Target’s stock, and causes 
Target to guarantee the loan to Newcorp. 
 Target borrows from Lender, with loan secured by Target’s assets, and uses the pro-
ceeds to repurchase shares from shareholders other than Buyer. 
 Newcorp borrows from Lender to acquire Target’s shares. Target borrows acquisition 
funds secured by its assets and pays them out as a dividend to Newcorp to repay the 
loan. Each step closes simultaneously. 
 Target borrows from Lender, secured by Target’s assets, then relends to Newcorp, 
which uses the funds to purchase shares. 
 Target with substantial subsidiaries arranges a loan to Target, secured by subsidiaries’ 
assets or guarantees, and uses proceeds to buy shares. 
192 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a). 
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In addition, there is a longstanding common law “equity insolvency” test 
that prohibits a corporation from repurchasing its shares when the corpora-
tion is or would be rendered unable to pay its debts as they come due.193 
DGCL section 174(a) imposes liability on directors for improper share 
repurchases, liability that cannot be exculpated under DGCL section 
102(b)(7). 194  Because Delaware law contains both “balance sheet” and 
“equitable” insolvency limitations on share repurchases, if a hypothetical 
LBO that rendered the firm insolvent is viewed as a share repurchase, it 
would quite clearly violate DGCL section 160.195 
Section 172, however, provides directors with a defense when they rely  
in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such infor-
mation, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by any 
of its officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by 
any other person as to matters the director reasonably believes are within 
such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has been 
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation, as to the 
value and amount of the assets, liabilities and/or net profits of the corpora-
tion or any other facts pertinent to the existence and amount of surplus or 
other funds from which dividends might properly be declared and paid, or 
with which the corporation’s stock might properly be purchased or  
redeemed.196  
As with other parallel provisions, such as section 141(e),197 such reliance 
must be reasonable.198 Directors’ liability would thus depend on the reason-
ableness of their reliance on the information they had before them about the 
solvency of the post-LBO company. From a counseling perspective, this 
provides a clear incentive to make sure that the board has a strong basis for 
 
193 See, e.g., SV Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch. 2010), 
aff ’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011). 
194 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 174(a). 
195 For a leading federal case applying Georgia law, see generally Munford v. Valuation  
Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 456 (11th Cir. 1996).  
196 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 172. 
197 Id. § 141(e) (providing for directors’ good faith reliance on corporation records). 
198 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985) (noting that for purposes of 
section 141(e), a report may be relied upon only if it is “pertinent to the subject matter upon which 
a board is called to act, and otherwise . . . entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance”), overruled 
in part on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); see also Mills Acquisition 
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1988) (warning that a board employing good faith 
reliance nevertheless has an “active and direct duty of oversight” in significant matters, including 
sales of control). 
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concluding that the post-LBO company would be solvent before approving 
a transaction that could or would be viewed as a share repurchase. In 
practice, this could be achieved by requiring a credible solvency opinion 
from Target’s investment banker prior to approving the LBO, as is done in 
the United Kingdom. 
b. Theory II: Dividends and Reductions-in-Capital 
Share repurchases are just one of the ways in which managers may 
“shovel all the assets in the corporate treasury out to the shareholders when 
the corporation has insufficient assets to pay its creditors or when the 
shareholder distribution renders the corporation unable to pay its credi-
tors.”199 It can also be done by dividend or reduction of capital. Because the 
effects on creditors are the same, the restrictions are largely the same.200  
i. The Analysis Under DGCL Section 174 
Under sections 170 and 173, dividends may only be paid out of surplus or 
net profits.201 As noted above, “surplus” is defined by subtracting “stated 
capital” and liabilities from assets. “Net profits” is a rather obscure concept, 
and dividends out of net profits are subject to limitations.202 The idea is 
clear enough: even when the firm has had years of losses and no surplus, it 
may be necessary to promise dividends to attract new capital. The “net 
profits” provision makes it possible to pay dividends in those circumstances. 
But how, exactly, to interpret this provision is quite problematic.203 
 
199 MANNING, supra note 154, at 63. 
200 This is why the Model Business Corporation Act treats distributions to shareholders in a 
unitary fashion. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 6.40, 8.33 & cmt. (2008); BLACK, supra note 179, 
§§ 1:3, 6:4. 
201 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 173. 
202 In particular, section 170 provides  
If the capital of the corporation, computed in accordance with §§ 154 and 244 of this 
title, shall have been diminished by depreciation in the value of its property, or by 
losses, or otherwise, to an amount less than the aggregate amount of the capital rep-
resented by the issued and outstanding stock of all classes having a preference upon 
the distribution of assets, the directors of such corporation shall not declare and pay 
out of such net profits any dividends upon any shares of any classes of its capital 
stock until the deficiency in the amount of capital represented by the issued and out-
standing stock of all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets shall 
have been repaired.  
Id. § 170(a). 
203 MANNING, supra note 154, at 82-84. 
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In the hypothetical LBO described earlier, the amounts distributed to 
shareholders are sufficiently large—and destructive of the firm’s solvency—
that if the distribution is viewed as a dividend, it would likely be held to 
exceed even the most flexible interpretation of sections 170 and 173. Moreover, 
as with share repurchases, so too here there seems to be a principle that a 
firm cannot pay a dividend if it “diminishes the ability of the company to 
pay its debts, or lessens the security of its creditors.”204  
The rest of the analysis follows the previous discussion. Under section 174, 
directors are personally liable for willful or negligent violation of section 
173.205 Under section 102(b)(7), this violation is understood to be a breach of 
fiduciary duty that cannot be exculpated.206 Finally, for there to be a defense 
under section 172, reliance must be reasonable and in good faith.207 A divi-
dend analysis thus does not add much to the share repurchase analysis. 
ii. The Relevance of the Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance 
A predictable response to the illegal stock repurchase and illegal divi-
dend theories is appeal to the so-called “doctrine of independent legal 
significance” (ILS). Does the fact that my hypothetical transaction is 
structured as a merger insulate it from challenge as a stock repurchase or 
dividend? Historically, the ILS doctrine emerged out of the 1930s and firms’ 
inability to raise new capital due to accrued preferred stock dividends that 
made it impossible to promise dividends on new common stock.208 In 
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, the Delaware Supreme Court authorized 
the use of a merger with a wholly owned subsidiary in which the old 
preferred and its arrearages were cancelled and replaced by new preferred in 
the merged entity and some common stock.209 Although one could view the 
use of the merger provision as an evasion of the limitation imposed on 
charter amendments, the court instead took the position that “[t]here is a 
clear distinction between the situations recognized by the General Law and 
the modes of procedure applicable to each of them . . . .”210  
 
204 In re Int’l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 255 (Del. Ch. 1914). 
205 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174. 
206 Id. § 102(b)(7). 
207 Id. § 172. 
208 For a concise historical summary, see WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 109-10 (3d ed. 2011). For a more comprehensive treatment, see generally 
C. Stephen Bigler & Blake Rohrbacher, Form or Substance? The Past, Present, and Future of the 
Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance, 63 BUS. LAW. 1 (2007).  
209 11 A.2d 331, 333-43 (Del. 1940). 
210 Id. at 342. 
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This approach later became known as the “doctrine of independent legal 
significance.”211 In the area of preferred stock, it has been clear ever since 
that changes to preferred stock rights and preferences (which are part of the 
corporate charter) can be made either by charter amendment (in which case 
there is a class vote provided by statute212) or by merger (in which case there 
is no class vote by statute unless specifically included in the certificate of 
designations213). This longstanding interpretation of the statute eventually 
morphed into a rule of contract interpretation, with courts interpreting the 
certificate of designations—the contract between preferred stockholders and 
the firm—as only providing for a class vote in mergers when specifically 
mentioned.214  
The ILS doctrine spread from the preferred stock context to a more 
general interpretation of sections 251 and 271.215 The Delaware courts have 
consistently held that a transaction structured as a sale of all or substantially 
all of a company’s assets under section 271, which complies with the proce-
dural requirements of that section, cannot be attacked as invalid for not also 
complying with the procedural requirements of the merger statute (section 
251), even if the resulting arrangement of corporate assets is identical to the 
result of a merger.216 The reverse is also true: a statutory merger does not 
constitute a sale of assets and thus need not comply with the procedural 
requirements of section 271.217 This same approach has been extended to 
purchases of stock for stock, and Delaware courts have consistently held 
that, although the outcome is identical to a section 251 merger, a transaction 
 
211 See, e.g., Langfelder v. Universal Labs., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D. Del. 1946).  
212 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242. 
213 See id. § 251. 
214 See, e.g., Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984) (“Pref-
erential rights are contractual in nature and therefore are governed by the express provisions of a 
company’s certificate of incorporation. . . . [They] must also be clearly expressed and will not be 
presumed.”). See generally Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. 19719, 2002 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 90 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff ’d sub nom. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper 
Fin. Corp., No. 680, 2003 Del. LEXIS 237 (Del. April 16, 2003); Warner Commc’ns Inc. v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum, No. 7899, 1985 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 459 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1985). For a description of the shift from a rule of 
statutory interpretation to a rule of statutory and contract interpretation, see D. Gordon Smith, 
Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital Contracts, 40 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 837-40 (2004). 
215 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271. 
216 See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963).  
217 See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 113-14 (Del. 1952).  
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structured as an exchange of stock need not comply with section 251 proce-
dures.218  
By placing the form of the transaction over its substance, the ILS doc-
trine has made an attractive shield against challenges. Although some might 
view ILS as a judicial wild card to be played when judges choose not to 
intervene for other reasons, there are clear doctrinal limits to its scope.219 
First, far from being a wild card, it has a narrow procedural focus. When the 
Delaware legislature came to codify it in the limited partnership context in 
2009, it provided: “Action validly taken pursuant to 1 provision of this 
chapter shall not be deemed invalid solely because it is identical or similar 
in substance to an action that could have been taken pursuant to some other 
provision of this chapter . . . .”220 
Second, from the beginning, it has been clear that ILS relates to chal-
lenges by preferred and common stockholders and not to creditor interests. 
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly embraced the “de facto 
merger doctrine”—the doctrinal antithesis to ILS—to protect creditors.221  
The third limitation on the scope of ILS is the distinction drawn in  
Delaware jurisprudence between “legal” and “equitable” claims, a distinction 
that finds expression in the famous and oft-cited language from Schnell v. 
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.: “[I]nequitable action does not become permissi-
ble simply because it is legally possible.”222 This two-level analysis has led 
Delaware courts, in appropriate circumstances, to recharacterize transac-
tions to protect vulnerable parties. Thus, for example, in Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 
the Delaware Supreme Court relied on tax law’s “step transaction” doctrine 
to recharacterize a complicated series of transactions that effected a “recapi-
talization.”223 This approach has figured in more recent Chancery Court 
opinions such as LAMPERS v. Crawford, in which Chancellor Chandler 
 
218 See, e.g., Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377-78 (Del. 1963); Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d 
1089, 1097-99 (Del. Ch. 1983), aff ’d, 467 A.2d 1274 (Del. 1983); Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92 
A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
219 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 214, at 848 (“The doctrine of independent legal significance is a 
rule of judicial abstention.”).  
220 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-
1101(h) (Supp. 2012). 
221 See, e.g., Orzeck, 195 A.2d at 378 (“We do not intend to be understood as holding that the 
doctrine of de facto merger is not recognized in Delaware. Such is not the case for it has been 
recognized in cases of sales of assets for the protection of creditors or stockholders who have 
suffered an injury by reason of failure to comply with the statute governing such sales.”). 
222 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). For a classic analysis, see Chancellor Allen’s opinion in 
SICPA Holding S.A. v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc., No. 15129, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 6, 1997).  
223 925 A.2d 1265, 1280-81 & n.31 (Del. 2007).  
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rejected an ILS argument and relied upon the step transaction doctrine to 
recharacterize a cash dividend, designed to be payable only upon the effective 
date of a stock-for-stock merger, as part of the merger consideration and 
therefore triggering appraisal rights.224  
The hypothetical LBO could be collapsed under any version of the step 
transaction doctrine, as each step is dependent on the simultaneous execu-
tion of the others, with everything closing simultaneously. 
c. Theory III: Would Approving the LBO Breach the Directors’ Duty of Loyalty? 
The principles that underlie the share repurchase and dividend theories 
may provide the grounds for a more general fiduciary duty account. Indeed, 
as discussed in more detail below, when one takes seriously the reemergence 
of the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem, it may be that directors’ 
understanding of their role should return from the contemporary exhorta-
tion to maximize equity value to the traditional goal of maximizing firm 
value. Given the role that fiduciary duty law plays in educating directors as 
to their duties,225 focusing on the duty of loyalty may be a useful strategy 
for reorienting directors.  
Traditional Delaware corporate law principles are instructive here. First, 
Delaware corporate law cases often state that the directors owe fiduciary 
duties to “the corporation” or to “the corporation and its stockholders.”226 
But this latter formulation is somewhat misleading, as is illustrated by cases 
in which stockholders have conflicting interests. In those situations, directors 
may take whatever action best serves the corporation or the entire body of 
stockholders.227 It is thus more accurate to say, in accord with the traditional 
 
224 918 A.2d 1171, 1191-92 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also Noddings Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Capstar 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 16538, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *24-25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 1999) (relying 
on the step transaction doctrine to combine two transactions in order to analyze them as one under 
a warrant agreement), aff ’d, No. 165, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 324 (Del. Sept. 22, 1999). 
225 Rock, supra note 176, at 1106. 
226 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not trustees, [corp-
orate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”); see 
also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“[D]irectors are charged with an 
unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.”), overruled in part by Gantler v. 
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). For a sampling of citations, see E. Norman Veasey & 
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing 
Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 764 n.8 (2008). 
227 See 2 EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON 
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2 (5th ed. Supp. 2012) (citing cases). 
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position, that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, for the benefit 
of the shareholders as a group (not “and to the shareholders”).228  
Second, it is well accepted that when a firm is insolvent, directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the creditors.229 Again, a more precise description would 
be that the duties still run to the corporation but now for the benefit of the 
creditors.230 
The traditional doctrine thus draws a line at the solvency–insolvency 
boundary. This, of course, raises the question of what happens as one 
approaches that line. As Chancellor Allen noted in his famous Credit 
Lyonnais opinion, shareholder incentives become distorted as the firm enters 
the “vicinity of insolvency”: “The possibility of insolvency can do curious 
things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior 
and creating complexities for directors.”231 Indeed, this distortion of share-
holder incentives is offered as an explanation for why, “[a]t least where a 
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is 
not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the 
corporate enterprise.”232  Chancellor Allen’s point here is, among other 
things, that the traditional view of the board’s duty as running to the 
corporation, and not directly to the shareholders, allows for the appropriate 
adjustment as the firm approaches insolvency, and that the board must be 
 
228 See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholders as Principals, in KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 
CORPORATE LAW AND TRUSTS LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR HAROLD FORD 105 
(Ian Ramsay ed., 2002); see also Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distribu-
tions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1074 n.4 (1983) (noting that management and 
directors owe duties to the stockholders generally, and not to individual or group holders); Paula J. 
Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder Activism, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 
301, 308-14 (2008) (exploring the legal contours of the fiduciary–stockholder relationship). 
229 Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing 
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992)), overruled in part on other grounds 
by N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
230 This principle is confirmed by the related procedural rules on standing to bring an action 
for breach of these fiduciary duties. Consider a claim that the directors’ breach of fiduciary duty 
has harmed the corporation. When a firm is solvent, shareholders may bring a derivative suit, and 
must satisfy its requirements, “because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s 
growth and increased value.” Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101. When a firm is insolvent, the creditors 
are eligible to bring a derivative suit because they become “the residual beneficiaries of any 
increase in value,” id., although they too must satisfy (as yet largely undeveloped) procedural 
requirements. 
Note, of course, that in either case—whether the firm is solvent or insolvent—the corporation 
itself may bring a suit against an officer or director for breach of fiduciary duty. 
231 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
232 Id. at *108. 
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allowed to take creditor interests into account. Thus, when a firm approaches 
insolvency, independent directors acting in good faith will be shielded from 
liability when they act in the interests of the corporate entity, even if their 
actions do not maximize shareholder value.233  
Henry Hu and Jay Westbrook reject this traditional way of thinking 
about fiduciary duties, arguing that it “is inconsistent with new financial 
learning and muddles the analysis of risk taking.”234 Instead, they argue for a 
strong form of the “no multiple masters” thesis—namely, that there should 
be no creditor-regarding duties so long as the corporation has not filed for 
bankruptcy because (a) maximizing corporate value will conflict with 
maximizing shareholder value, especially as the corporation encounters 
financial distress; and (b) when the corporation does encounter distress, the 
board should maximize shareholder value.235 This is because  
the investment risk taking that would be optimal from the corporation’s 
standpoint—or from the managers’ or creditors’ standpoint—differs radically 
from shareholder-optimal risk taking. Simply put, risk taking that is optimal 
for the corporate entity itself (and most managers and creditors) is likely to 
be too cowardly from the standpoint of well-diversified shareholders.236  
Hu and Westbrook’s argument is important because it recognizes the 
implications of a shareholder-value-maximization approach to director 
fiduciary duties. They are right that shareholder value and corporate value 
can, and will, diverge, especially as the firm encounters financial distress. 
They are also correct that shifting fiduciary duties as the firm becomes 
insolvent may somewhat undermine accountability. And finally, on their 
approach, the hypothetical is easily resolved: the board should approve the 
LBO, even when it knows that doing so will render the firm insolvent. 
As we continue to dig out from the 2008 meltdown and reckon with the 
enormous social costs of financial distress, this 2007 view seems otherworldly. 
By embracing what seems to me to be a reductio ad absurdum, Hu and 
Westbrook approach a form of equity fetishism—maximizing equity value 
for its own sake and not as a tool for building valuable firms. By contrast, 
the traditional corporate law exhortation to maximize firm value is a very 
 
233 See, e.g., Prod. Res. Grp., 863 A.2d at 788 (noting the shield Credit Lyonnais provided for 
directors to pay the company’s bills “as a first priority”). 
234 Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1359 (2007). 
235 Id. at 1357. 
236 Id.; see also id. at 1378 (“The overall effect is to exacerbate management’s aversion to risk 
and encourage excessive worry about the corporate entity’s success or failure.”). 
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useful reminder that doing so—and not maximizing shareholder value—is 
what corporate law is, and should be, about. 
i. Was the Board’s Decision in the Best Interest of the Corporation? 
Let us now return to the opening hypothetical: suppose the board is 
confronted with an LBO that will render the firm insolvent. If we take a 
traditional “entity” view that the board of directors owes its fiduciary duty 
to the corporation—and resist the now conventional identification of the 
corporation with the shareholders—would proceeding with the transaction 
be in the best interest of the corporation? From that perspective, the board 
must consider both the potential benefits and the potential harms of the 
decision to the corporation. When the transaction at issue is an LBO that, 
as in our hypothetical, will render the firm insolvent, the analysis is surpris-
ingly straightforward and unequivocal.  
Consider, first, the harm to the corporation: financial distress and bank-
ruptcy. While obviously fact-specific, studies indicate that bankruptcy is 
costly to firms, with direct costs of around 3% and total costs of 20% to 30% 
of firm value.237  
 What is the benefit to the corporation of the hypothetical LBO? There 
would seem to be little or none. From a finance perspective, the main 
potential corporate benefit from an LBO is increased efficiency, driven by 
the disciplining effect of debt: managers are more likely to make hard 
choices (e.g., closing plants) if they must do so in order to avoid bank-
ruptcy.238 That benefit, however, is lost if, as in the hypothetical, the LBO 
itself renders the firm insolvent. When that happens, the benefits of the 
transaction all flow to the shareholders.239 
 
237 See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 
J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984) (finding, from a small sample, that costs can exceed 20% but, on average, 
comprise 11% to 17% of firm value); Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial 
(Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J. 
FIN. 1443, 1463 (1998) (finding total costs to be 10% to 20% of firm value); Lawrence A. Weiss, 
Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 299 
(1990) (finding direct costs around 3%).  
238 Jensen, supra note 21, at 324. 
239 See Steven Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 647, 671-72 (1996) (“Because a solvent corporation has a fiduciary duty to creditors only 
where its action would cause insolvency, the term vicinity of insolvency should, therefore, only 
mean . . . that insolvency is one of the reasonably expected outcomes. Perhaps a better term for 
vicinity of insolvency therefore should be ‘contingent insolvency.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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ii. Would the Directors’ Breach of Fiduciary Duty Be Exculpated? 
To complete the corporate law analysis, we need to consider what sort of 
breach of fiduciary duty is being alleged and whether directors would be 
exculpated under a DGCL section 102(b)(7) charter provision. Because such 
provisions are pervasive, the claim would have to be pled as a breach of the 
duty of loyalty. Does it fit?  
Part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is the duty to act in good faith.240 
Moreover, section 102(b)(7) explicitly precludes exculpation for actions not 
in good faith.241 How does Delaware understand “good faith”? The analysis 
most relevant to the hypothetical is the Chancery Court’s in In re The Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, a case arising out of the dreadful decision to 
hire Michael Ovitz and his $140 million termination payment.242 Chancellor 
Chandler held that allegations that directors “consciously and intentionally 
disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ 
attitude concerning a material corporate decision,” adequately alleged a 
breach of the duty of good faith.243 The allegations implied that the direc-
tors “knew that they were making material decisions without adequate 
information and without adequate deliberation, and that they simply did 
not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer 
injury or loss.”244  
Chancellor Chandler, in language specifically approved by the Delaware 
Supreme Court, elaborated on the concept of bad faith. He explained that 
bad faith may be shown 
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of  
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts 
with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary 
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for his duties.245 
 
240 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[A] 
director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her 
actions are in the corporation’s best interest.” (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 
(Del. Ch. 2003))); see generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of 
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010).  
241 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
242 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (ruling on the motion to dismiss). 
243 Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted). 
244 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
245 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (post-trial 
opinion) (footnotes omitted), aff ’d, Brehm v. Eisner (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The Delaware Supreme Court quoted the language above in Brehm, 906 
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In order to obtain a ruling under this standard that the officers’ or directors’ 
actions breached the duty of loyalty, one would have to argue that, in single-
mindedly focusing on maximizing shareholder value and acting with indiffer-
ence to the corporation’s insolvency risk, they adopted a “‘we don’t care 
about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”246 What 
strengthens the claim is that, in the hypothetical LBO, not one penny of the 
proceeds goes into firm projects. Instead, all the money raised by borrowing 
against firm assets was paid out to the pre-LBO shareholders and in fees. 
From the corporation’s perspective, this could be viewed as the sort of “no 
win” proposition that provides strong evidence of a lack of good faith.247 
As noted above, it is precisely this aspect of the traditional understand-
ing of fiduciary duties to which Hu and Westbrook object.248 When, as in 
the hypothetical, there is a clear conflict between what is good for the 
corporation and what is good for the shareholders, Hu and Westbrook view 
acting in the interests of the corporation as a form of cowardice. Alterna-
tively stated, the traditional view that the duty of loyalty runs to the 
corporation, if directors understand and internalize it, can orient directors 
when insolvency looms and the normal assumption that what is good for the 
shareholders is good for the corporation breaks down.  
iii. The Fit with the Delaware “Zone of Insolvency” Cases 
How does this “fiduciary duty” theory fit with the Delaware cases on the 
duties of directors “in the zone of insolvency”? The canon is quite compact 
and well-known: Credit Lyonnais,249 Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT 
Group, Inc.,250 Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,251 and 
North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Ghee-
walla.252 No Delaware case directly addresses the question of directors’ 
duties when the decision itself renders the firm insolvent.  
 
A.2d at 67, and Stone, 911 A.2d at 369. The fact that defendants prevailed after a six-week trial 
does not affect the validity of the Chancellor’s articulation of the legal rule. 
246 In re Disney, 825 A.2d at 289 (emphasis added). 
247 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing a “no-win” situation that 
led to allegations of lack of good faith). 
248 See supra text accompanying notes 234-236. 
249 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
250 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004), overruled in part by N. Am. Catholic Educ. Program-
ming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
251 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff ’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 
A.2d 438 (Del. 2007). 
252 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007). 
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The Credit Lyonnais case arose out of the failed LBO of MGM by 
Giancarlo Parretti. Credit Lyonnais had financed MGM’s escape from 
bankruptcy and had received governance rights.253 After a trial, the court 
concluded that Parretti had breached his agreements and that Credit 
Lyonnais was entitled to exercise its rights to remove him and his associates 
from the MGM board of directors.254 In the course of considering Parretti’s 
claim that the bank and the management team breached a fiduciary duty of 
good faith and fair dealing owed to Parretti by “failing to facilitate sale 
transactions that Parretti sought in order to help him regain control,” the 
court found that the “management group acted prudently with respect to 
these transactions from the point of view of MGM.”255 The case, however, is 
mainly remembered for Chancellor Allen’s provocative obiter dicta explor-
ing the divergence of equity and enterprise incentives in the “zone of 
insolvency.”256 
Production Resources arose out of an attempt to collect a debt.257 Because 
the defendant, NCT, a limited liability company, continued operating even 
though it seemed to be insolvent, the plaintiff, PRG, a creditor, sought to 
protect its interests by appointing a receiver under DGCL section 291.258 
PRG also alleged a breach of fiduciary duty against the NCT board, and, 
moreover, argued that because NCT was insolvent, PRG should be able to 
bring a direct claim, rather than having to satisfy the requirements for a 
derivative claim.259 
The court granted the plaintiff ’s demand for appointment of a receiver.260 
With respect to the fiduciary duty claims, the issue was whether the claims 
were derivative or direct. PRG conceded that the claims would have been 
derivative had the company been solvent because they were based on injury 
to the corporation.261 But, PRG claimed, once the company became insol-
vent, the claims should become direct claims in the hands of the creditors.262 
Not surprisingly, the court rejected this argument and held that claims that 
are derivative in a solvent company remain derivative in an insolvent 
 
253 Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *7-9. 
254 Id. at *10. 
255 Id. at *107-08. 
256 Id. at *108 n.55. 
257 Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 774 (Del. Ch. 2004), overruled in 
part by N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
258 Id. at 774-75. 
259 Id. at 775. 
260 Id. at 775-76. 
261 Id. at 776. 
262 Id. 
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company.263 Because neither party briefed the procedural issues that arise 
once the claim is characterized as derivative (e.g., whether demand by 
creditors is required), the court left those issues for another day.264  
In the course of this analysis, then–Vice Chancellor Strine included a 
wide-ranging discussion that tried to make sense of and bring order to the 
literature on Credit Lyonnais, with a clear suggestion, again in dictum, that 
“Credit Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from stockholders who 
claimed that the directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk so long as 
the company would not technically breach any legal obligations.”265 The 
implication, of course, is that Credit Lyonnais did not provide creditors with 
a sword.  
Trenwick arose out of the failure of a multinational insurance group.266 
The case was brought by a litigation trust that emerged from the reorganiza-
tion of the top U.S. subsidiary with the authority to bring claims belonging 
to the subsidiary (but not, according to the court, the subsidiary’s creditors’ 
claims).267 It brought claims against the parent company, alleging a variety 
of violations including breach of fiduciary duty, and against the directors of 
the subsidiary, alleging breach of the duties of care and loyalty.268 
In the course of wrestling with (and ultimately dismissing) what seems 
to have been a badly drafted complaint, Chancellor Strine suggested, again 
in dictum, that directors of a wholly owned subsidiary may “owe a duty to 
the subsidiary not to take action benefiting a parent corporation that they 
know will render the subsidiary unable to meet its legal obligations.”269 
In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, the most recent opinion bearing on directors’ duties to creditors, 
the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue of creditor standing. 270 
The court squarely rejected plaintiffs’ claim that creditors should have direct 
standing to bring fiduciary duty claims against directors when the corpora-
tion is either in the “zone of insolvency” or insolvent.271 Rather, the court 
 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 795-96. 
265 Id. at 788. 
266 Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 172 (Del. Ch. 2006), 
aff ’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007). 
267 Id. at 172-73. Insurance companies, like banks, are exempt from federal bankruptcy law 
and have a specialized insolvency regime.  
268 Id. at 172-74. 
269 Id. at 203. 
270 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007). 
271 Id. at 103. 
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held, a claim that is derivative when the firm is solvent remains derivative 
when it becomes insolvent.272 
As this quick review shows, Delaware has yet to address the key issue in 
my hypothetical, although there is supportive language in Trenwick, quoted 
above. 
d. Theory IV: Directors’ Duty to Obey the Law? 
In the hypothetical, if the transaction went forward, the LBO could well 
be viewed as a fraudulent transfer, as discussed above. Indeed, the hypothet-
ical contains suggestions of fraud:  
In the course of the sale process, [senior managers] have directed the prepa-
ration of new projections that, to an impartial eye, would be found to be 
wildly optimistic or even fraudulent. The board knows that the juiced pro-
jections were prepared for the marketing effort, that they have minimal 
foundation, and that the buyers and their financing banks have been relying 
upon them without realizing just how juiced they are.273  
Would directors, in knowingly approving an LBO that would constitute a 
fraudulent transfer, or knowingly presenting fraudulent projections, violate 
their “fiduciary duty to obey the law,” and thereby breach their duty of 
loyalty? 
Is there such a duty and, if so, what is its scope? In German corporate 
law, this is known as the “duty to legality.”274 The ALI Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance explicitly limit profit maximization and shareholder gain: 
“Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the 
corporation, in the conduct of its business: (1) Is obliged, to the same extent 
as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law.”275 Section 4.01 
 
272 Id. Even though the holding of the case is quite narrow and technical, the case has been 
read as rejecting any fiduciary duties for the benefit of creditors in the zone of insolvency. This 
reading is largely based on the statement in Gheewalla that  
[w]hen a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for 
Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fidu-
ciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business 
judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder 
owners. 
Id. at 101. This statement is clearly dictum. Moreover, it does not address the core issue raised by 
“wrongful trading” theories—namely, actions taken that threaten to render the company insolvent. 
273 See supra Section IV.A. 
274 Florian M. Reinhart, The Director’s and Officer’s Duty to Legality? 2-4 & n.4 (Jan. 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
275 ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (1992). 
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states that a “director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the 
director’s or officer’s functions in good faith.”276 The comments make clear 
that “a director or officer violates the duty to perform his or her functions in 
good faith if he or she knowingly causes the corporation to disobey the 
law.”277 Similarly, DGCL section 102(b)(7) precludes exculpation for “a 
knowing violation of law.”278  
 Chancellor Strine has been particularly attentive to the “duty to legality” 
aspect of the duty of loyalty. As he stated in In re Massey Energy: 
Delaware law does not charter law breakers. Delaware law allows corpora-
tions to pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory 
floor, which is the requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue 
“lawful business” by “lawful acts.” As a result, a fiduciary of a Delaware cor-
poration cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by knowingly causing it 
to seek profit by violating the law.279 
What is the scope and content of this duty in Delaware law?280 Does it 
apply to all obligations of the corporation, including “private law” obliga-
tions to contracting parties, or is it limited to “public law” obligation? And, 
if limited to public law obligations, on which side of the private–public line 
does fraudulent conveyance fall?  
The case law articulating the “duty to legality” seems to focus on public 
law obligations such as campaign finance laws,281 bribery,282 price fixing,283 
mine safety regulations,284 off-label marketing of prescription drugs,285 and 
 
276 Id. § 4.01. 
277 Id. § 4.01(a) cmt. d. 
278 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
279 In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 83, at *73-74 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (footnotes omitted). For similar statements by 
Chancellor Strine, see Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007); Prod. Res. 
Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 n.52 (Del. Ch. 2004), overruled in part by N. 
Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); Metro 
Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
Vice Chancellor Laster has recently added his voice. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 
A.3d 313, 352 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
280 For a review of the case law, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate 
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 34-38 (2006).  
281 Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974). 
282 Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909). 
283 Plate v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 275 Cal. Rptr. 667, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
284 In re Massey Energy, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *74.  
285 La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 353 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
  
1966 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1907 
unfair labor practices.286 Chancellor Strine, in law review mode, likewise 
seems to focus on public law obligations.287 
Assuming, then, that the “duty to legality” is in fact limited to public 
law obligations (criminal and regulatory) and does not impose a duty not to 
breach contracts of the corporation, how are fraud and fraudulent convey-
ance to be understood? To the extent that the hypothetical presents a 
credible claim of fraud, it would seem to fit comfortably within the existing 
doctrine. As Vice Chancellor Laster has noted, “Corporate misconduct 
involving fraud or illegality presents a different situation. Even under a 
pure Caremark monitoring theory . . . .”288  
But what about knowingly approving a transaction that will constitute a 
fraudulent conveyance? Is fraudulent conveyance law “public” or “private”? 
In In re Cybergenics, the Third Circuit considered whether fraudulent 
conveyance claims in failed LBOs belong to the debtor (and thus were sold 
when all the assets of the debtor were sold) or to the creditors (and thus 
could be pursued for their benefit by a trustee, by the debtor in possession 
acting as a trustee or directly).289 In reaching the conclusion that fraudulent 
conveyance claims belong to the creditors, not the bankrupt corporation, 
Judge Rendell emphasized the extent to which fraudulent conveyance 
protects the “transferor’s creditors, whose efforts to collect their debts have 
essentially been thwarted as a consequence of the transferor’s actions.”290 In 
emphasizing fraudulent conveyance’s roots in fraud (or even criminal 
law),291 the Third Circuit, in effect, located fraudulent conveyance claims on 
the public side of the line. By contrast, in the context of determining the 
scope of permissible bankruptcy jurisdiction and the limits imposed by the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
 
286 Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306 (N.Y. 1947). 
287 Strine, et al., supra note 240, at 652 n.69 (citing cases).  
288 Pyott, 46 A.3d at 352 (referring to In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 
(Del. Ch. 1996)). 
289 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery (In re 
Cybergenics Corp.), 226 F.3d 237, 239 (3d Cir. 2000). 
290 Id. at 241 (emphasis removed). But see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cyber-
genics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 555-69 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(vacating the panel decision and wrestling with the question whether the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000), precludes 
derivative creditor standing to assert fraudulent conveyance claims). See generally Nancy Haller, 
Comment, Cybergenics II: Precedent and Policy vs. Plain Meaning, 56 ME. L. REV. 365 (2004) 
(evaluating the Third Circuit’s en banc decision).  
291 In re Cybergenics, 226 F.3d at 242 (citing Barry L. Zaretsky, The Fraudulent Transfer Law 
as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1168-71 (1995), as “explaining that 
fraudulent transfer law started as part creditor protection and part criminal law, but evolved into a 
law primarily for creditor protection”). 
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Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, viewed fraudulent conveyance actions 
brought for the purpose of augmenting the estate against parties who have 
not submitted claims as “quintessentially suits at common law that more 
nearly resemble state-law contract claims” and thus “appear [to be] matters 
of private rather than public right.”292 
If the “fraud” aspects of fraudulent conveyance are sufficient to put it on 
the “public law” side, then knowingly approving an LBO that is a fraudulent 
conveyance, like knowingly approving corporate action to defraud a third 
party, would breach directors’ duty of loyalty, even if selling the company 
for a sky-high price benefited shareholders. 
B. Shareholder Opportunism in Complex Corporate Structures:  
the Dynegy Battle 
The recent battle at Dynegy Inc. between shareholders and their loyal 
managers versus creditors provides a good context for better understanding 
the structure of actual conflicts and how they can be controlled. The 
Dynegy fight involves complex financial structures nested in a holding 
company structure with numerous layers of subsidiaries. Because such 
complexity plays a large role in the waging and controlling of current 
battles, it deserves closer attention. 
Dynegy is in the wholesale power business.293 As of the end of 2010, it 
owned seventeen electric power plants in six states.294 Like many public 
corporations, Dynegy is, in fact, a group of companies, with the publicly 
held parent, Dynegy Inc., nothing more than a holding company at the top 
of a complex pyramid.295 As we will see, this common structure presents a 
variety of possibilities for shareholders to extract value from creditors. 
The chart in Figure 3 is a simplified view of Dynegy before its August 
2011 restructuring. Publicly held Dynegy Inc. owns all of the shares of 
 
292 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989); accord Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011) (applying 
Granfinanciera in determining the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the limits imposed by 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution). 
293 Dynegy’s power plants largely sell power on the wholesale energy markets operated by 
regional Independent System Operators (ISO), such as NYISO, or Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTO). See Report of Susheel Kirpalani, Examiner 19, In re Dynegy Holdings, 
L.L.C., No. 11-38111 (CGM), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Dynegy Examiner 
Report]. ISOs and RTOs typically operate regional electricity grids, administer a region's 
wholesale electricity markets, and provide reliability planning for the region's bulk electricity 
system.  
294 Id. at 20. 
295 Id. at 22. 
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Dynegy Holdings, Inc. (DHI), which itself holds the shares of lower-level 
holding companies. The ultimate operating companies are at the bottom of 
the chart, five layers below the publicly owned parent.296  
 
Figure 3297 
Why do firms adopt a structure with numerous wholly owned subsidiar-
ies and subsidiaries of subsidiaries?298 There are a variety of reasons.299 In 
some cases, the structure is adopted because the limited liability of the 
corporate form allows liabilities of subsidiaries to be contained. Sometimes 
it is necessary in order to do business in a foreign jurisdiction that bars 
branches or divisions of foreign firms. Sometimes it is necessary or useful in 
satisfying local regulatory requirements (e.g., licenses or, in the case of 
regulated utilities, the public utilities commission). Sometimes it is adopted 
because selling or buying a subsidiary is far easier than selling or buying 
 
296 Id. 
 297 Id. at 21. 
298 According to Richard Squire, the 100 largest U.S. public companies (by revenue) in 2010 
reported an average of 245 major subsidiaries, with a median of 114. Richard Squire, Strategic 
Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 606 n.1 (2011).  
299 For prominent contributions to this literature, see Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified  
Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 621-22 
(1975); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 
507-09, 516-17 (1976); Robert J. Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent 
Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 235 & n.1 (1976). See generally Squire, supra 
note 298. 
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specific assets: a firm decides to acquire another firm and knows that 
someday it may wish to sell it. And sometimes the structure is adopted to 
facilitate financing: it allows the pledging of particular cash flows to repay 
debt taken on the security of specified assets. As we will see, although 
company structure raises few classic shareholder issues (at least when the 
subsidiaries are all wholly owned and solvent), it can raise a variety of 
shareholder–creditor issues.  
In the case of Dynegy, most of the public debt was issued by the top-
level subsidiary, DHI, with the cash flows necessary to pay bondholders 
coming through dividends from the lower level operating subsidiaries (as 
DHI itself has no operations).300 DHI also had bank debt and lease guaranty 
obligations. As of July 30, 2011, DHI had approximately $1.5 billion in bank 
debt, $3.5 billion in public bond debt, and $550 million in lease obligations. 
Although the bank debt contained a variety of affirmative and negative 
covenants and events of default, the bond debt was largely “covenant lite.” 
DHI’s bond debt was not guaranteed by Dynegy or by the DHI subsidiar-
ies. The main protective covenant restricted DHI and its subsidiaries from 
granting liens unless the DHI senior notes were secured on equivalent 
terms as the new secured debt. Importantly, there were no covenants 
restricting the transfer of DHI’s assets, or restricting dividends from DHI, 
or financial tests such as EBITDA ratios. 
Moving down the corporate structure, one arrives at the Roseton and 
Danskammer facilities—formerly of Central Hudson Gas—that Dynegy 
acquired in 2001 using long-term financing provided by a sale-leaseback 
transaction.301 In particular, four of the six power plants comprising those 
facilities were sold in an asset-backed sale-leaseback transaction with 
Danskammer O.L. L.L.C. and Roseton O.L. L.L.C., subsidiaries of PSEG. 
Dynegy subsidiaries Dynegy Danskammer and Dynegy Roseton became 
lessees under leases that expire in 2031 and 2035, respectively. The transac-
tion was financed by a combination of equity and pass-through trust certifi-
cates issued by the PSEG entities and secured by a mortgage on the 
underlying power plants. DHI guaranteed the lease payments and perfor-
mance obligations, with restrictions against DHI selling all or substantially 
all of its assets, with the acquirer, in such a case, being obligated to assume 
 
300 For the following discussion on Dynegy’s public debt structure, see Dynegy Examiner 
Report, supra note 293, at 22-25. 
301 For the following discussion on Dynegy’s lease guaranties, see id. at 24. 
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the guarantee (the “successor obligor” clause).302 Below is the examiner’s 
graphic showing the financing structure. 
 
Figure 4303 
 
Then financial disaster struck. The price of electrical energy crashed, 
driven by a collapse in natural gas prices and reduced demand due to the 
economic slowdown.304 The Roseton and Danskammer facilities were no 
longer able to generate sufficient revenues to meet their lease obligations.305 
By June 2010, Dynegy’s stock had dropped to $3.85 per share.306 In August 
2010, Dynegy and Blackstone entered into a merger agreement at $4.50 per 
share.307 In October 2010, Seneca, a hedge fund, bought a 9.3% stake, while 
Carl Icahn reported approximately 10%.308 Both Icahn and Seneca opposed 
the Blackstone offer as inadequate. In November 2010, on the eve of the 
 
302 Intragroup guarantees are very common. See Squire, supra note 298, at 606 n.2 (noting that, 
in 2010, 63% of the largest U.S. companies (by revenue) reported using intragroup guaranties).  
303 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 25. 
304 See Dynegy Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011). 
305 See Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 71. 
306 See Dynegy Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 46 (Mar. 8, 2012). 
307 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 26. 
308 Hillary Canada, The Morning Leverage: Icahn Enters the Dynegy Ring, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2010/10/12/the-morning-leverage-icahn-enters-the-dynegy-ring. 
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shareholder vote, Blackstone increased its offer to $5.00 per share, a price 
the shareholders still rejected.309  
Soon thereafter, Icahn, who by now owned around 14.5%,310 announced a 
tender offer for all outstanding shares at $5.50 per share.311 Seneca opposed 
Icahn’s offer as still inadequate.312 In February 2011, shareholders rejected 
Icahn’s tender offer.313 
In the wake of two rejected acquisition proposals, Dynegy’s management 
resigned and its directors announced that they would not stand for reelec-
tion.314 The board was expanded to include Icahn and Seneca nominees, 
interim management was installed, and Icahn and Seneca assumed effective 
control.315 At the same time, it was clear that Dynegy would breach the 
covenants of its bank debt unless it restructured.316 
At this point, Dynegy began to pursue a complex and audacious plan to 
free value for shareholders from the claims of creditors. It proceeded in 
several phases.317 The first step was to reorganize the operating subsidiaries 
so that the coal-fired generating facilities would be held by Dynegy Mid-
west Generation Corp. (“CoalCo”) while the gas-fired facilities would be 
held by Dynegy Power Corp. (“GasCo”). These two new entities would be 
indirect wholly owned subsidiaries of DHI and structured as “bankruptcy 
remote” entities with limits on the dividends that could be paid. A new 
credit facility, to replace DHI’s old credit facility that was approaching 
default, would be arranged, using GasCo and CoalCo as collateral.318 The 
unprofitable Danskammer and Roseton facilities would be left behind. 
PSEG, the counterparty in the Danskammer and Roseton sale-leaseback 
transaction, challenged the restructuring under the successor obligor 
clause.319 In essence, PSEG argued that the restructuring, by allowing 
GasCo and CoalCo to take on additional debt for the benefit of DHI, and 
 
309 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 26. 
310 Naureen S. Malik, Big Dynegy Holder Opposes Icahn-Backed Buyout Bid, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
20, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703886904576031632596026972.html. 
311 Dynegy Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 45 (Mar. 8, 2011). 
312 Malik, supra note 310. 
313 Annual Report, supra note 311, at 45.  
314 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 27-28. 
315 Id. at 27-28, 32. 
316 Id. at 33. 
317 Here I follow the Examiner’s Report which, despite extensive redactions, is the most 
complete description available. Id. at 49-50, 59-67. 
318 Id. at 71.  
319 For the following discussion on the legal challenges to the restructuring, I draw on the 
Examiner’s Report. See id. at 72-83.  
  
1972 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1907 
by moving the valuable gas- and coal-fired facilities into bankruptcy-remote 
entities while leaving the impaired Danskammer and Roseton facilities 
behind, undermined the value of DHI’s guarantee of the Danskammer and 
Roseton lease obligations.320  
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected PSEG’s claims for several rea-
sons. First, it held that the successor obligor clause, by its terms, only bound 
DHI and not the DHI subsidiaries, in contrast to other provisions that 
applied to both DHI and its “Principal Subsidiary.”321 Because the restruc-
turing did not involve the transfer of all or substantially all of DHI’s  
assets—namely, the stock that it held in lower-level holding companies—it 
did not violate the successor obligor provision.322  
Second, because DHI continued indirectly to own 100% of GasCo and 
CoalCo, the reorganization did not transfer any assets away from its ulti-
mate ownership.323 DHI, according to the defendants and to the Chancery 
Court, would continue to hold all of the power plants it held before, so the 
guaranty would be no less secure.324  
Finally, the court rejected PSEG’s claim that transferring the valuable 
generating facilities away from Danskammer and Roseton constituted a 
fraudulent conveyance. According to the court, the transfer was not a 
fraudulent conveyance because: (1) it was not a transfer (because the assets 
remained indirectly owned); (2) DHI did not receive less than equivalent 
value (for the same reason); and (3) plaintiff could not establish that DHI 
was or would be rendered insolvent by the transfer.325 Indeed, the court 
pointed out, the reorganization would allow DHI to replace its old credit 
facility, avoid default, and extend the maturity of the senior secured debt by 
around four years.326 
With the Chancery Court refusing to grant an injunction, the reorgani-
zation went forward, creating separate coal and gas “silos” with a new 
intermediate holding company, DGI, as in Figure 5. 
 
 
   
 
320 Id. at 72-74. 
321 Roseton O.L., L.L.C. v. Dynegy Holdings, Inc., No. 6689-VCP, 2011 WL 3275965, at *11-13 
(Del. Ch. July 29, 2011). 
322 Id. 
323 Id. at *11. 
324 Id. at *11-12. 
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Figure 5327 
At this point, the reorganization plan moved to phase two: transferring 
the CoalCo assets out from under DHI to become a subsidiary of the 
publicly held parent, Dynegy Inc.328 Here, the goal seems to have been to 
insulate these assets from DHI’s obligations, to preserve value for share-
holders in the event of an (inevitable) DHI bankruptcy, and possibly to put 
pressure on DHI bondholders to accept DHI’s exchange offer. 
   
 
327 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 67. 
328 The discussion of phase two follows the Examiner’s Report. See id. at 86-95. 
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As Figure 6 shows, the coal assets were transferred to Dynegy Inc. in 
exchange for an “undertaking” from Dynegy Inc. to DGI, a newly formed 
subsidiary of DHI. 
 
Figure 6329 
 
Next, Dynegy and DHI entered into an amended and restated undertak-
ing which replaced DGI with DHI as the recipient of payments made. This 
was achieved by DGI assigning the undertaking to DHI in exchange for a 
note payable to DGI, as per Figure 7. 
   
 
329 Id. at 84. 
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Figure 7330 
 
A key provision in the amended undertaking, inserted when it was trans-
ferred from DGI to DHI, allowed Dynegy to reduce its obligations under 
the undertaking by reducing DHI’s obligations under its outstanding bonds, 
including by sponsoring an exchange offer at a discount.331  
On September 15, 2011, Dynegy announced an exchange offer for $1.25 
billion in DHI-issued bonds. In response, DHI bondholders sought to 
enjoin the exchange offer and to undo the transfer of CoalCo away from 
DHI.332 The complaint, filed in the N.Y. Supreme Court against Dynegy, 
DHI, overlapping Dynegy and DHI directors, and others, alleged inten-
tional and constructive fraudulent conveyance, unlawful distribution, 
unlawful dividend, and breach of fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good 
faith.333 
The exchange offer failed to gain sufficient support and was terminated 
on November 3, 2011.334 On November 7, 2011, DHI and other subsidiaries 
(but not Dynegy Inc.) filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.335 With the 
bankruptcy filing, the action moved to bankruptcy court, where an examiner, 
 
330 Id. at 87. 
331 Id. 
332 Peg Brickley & Matt Wirz, Bondholders Sue Dynegy, Challenge Restructuring, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903791504576586850956560150.html.  
333 Complaint at 2-3, Avenue Invs. L.P. v. Dynegy Inc., No. 652599/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 
21, 2011). 
334 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 101. 
335 Mike Spector, Dynegy Files for Unusual Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2011, at B1. 
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Susheel Kirpalani, a bankruptcy lawyer at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 
Sullivan, L.L.P., was appointed and asked to complete an independent 
investigation of the events leading up to the bankruptcy. In a lengthy report, 
Kirpalani summarized the various stages of the transaction and examined 
potential claims.336 His analysis provides a very useful guide to how existing 
doctrines can be employed to control shareholder opportunism. 
The key transaction was the transfer of CoalCo away from DHI. 
CoalCo’s cash flows were thereafter unavailable to satisfy claims of DHI 
creditors, including claims under DHI’s guaranty of the Roseton and 
Danskammer leases. The key question thus became whether the value of the 
undertaking was reasonably equivalent to the value of CoalCo. Kirpalani 
concluded that the value of the undertaking, to the extent it could be 
valued, was far less than the value of CoalCo. A second key finding was that 
DHI was either insolvent or rendered insolvent by the transfer of CoalCo—
a finding contested by the defendants.337  
With these two factual findings, Kirpalani concluded that the transfer 
constituted both an intentional and a constructive fraudulent conveyance. In 
addition, he concluded that the directors of DHI, who had also worked for 
Dynegy and thus faced a clear conflict of interest, breached their duty of 
loyalty to DHI by considering only the interests of Dynegy and its share-
holders, when their duties ran, instead, to the creditors of DHI. Finally, he 
relied on a corporate law doctrine not explored above and found that the 
DHI directors, by transferring the opportunity to repurchase the DHI 
bonds at a discount to Dynegy in exchange for no consideration, usurped a 
DHI corporate opportunity. Although claims of illegal distributions and 
illegal dividends were made in the September N.Y. Supreme Court com-
plaint,338 the examiner did not express an opinion on those claims. 
A good lawyer, Kirpalani relied on a variety of alternative legal  
approaches. Intentional and constructive fraudulent conveyance theories 
formed an important part of Kirpalani’s analysis, but he did not stop there. 
Once he concluded that there was a strong showing that DHI, the debtor, 
had been (or became) insolvent at the time of the transfers, he relied on 
fiduciary duty law to attack the conflict of interest of the overlapping 
directors: 
No rational board of directors would have transferred CoalCo to an unrelated, 
third party on the terms and conditions under which DGI (and [DHI]) 
 
336 See generally Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293. Unless otherwise noted, the fol-
lowing discussion draws from this report. Id. at 1-11. 
337 Id. at 3-5. 
338 Complaint, supra note 333, at 2-3. 
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transferred it. Dynegy Inc. got much better terms than any third party 
would have gotten with respect to the initial Undertaking, and even better 
terms in the amended version of the Undertaking.339  
Had the DHI directors been independent of Dynegy and its controlling 
shareholders, it would have been a somewhat harder argument to make, 
although still strong. 
In another way as well, the report highlights the value of deploying mul-
tiple legal approaches. Dynegy and its shareholders primarily focused on 
complying with the terms of the “covenant lite” debt issued by DHI, 
seemingly believing that they would be in the clear if they complied with 
the terms of those contracts. And, in fact, the examiner, like the Delaware 
Chancery Court, concluded that the first step of the reorganization—
rearranging the coal and gas assets separate silos and leaving the troubled 
Roseton and Danskammer facilities behind—did not violate the successor 
obligor clause or any other terms of the indenture.340 The examiner argued, 
however, that compliance with the indenture alone is not sufficient, because  
creditors of insolvent corporations have the right to avail themselves of 
non-contractual protections, such as fiduciary duties, “[b]ecause, by con-
tract, the creditors have the right to benefit from the firm’s operations until 
they are fully repaid, it is they who have an interest in ensuring that the 
directors comply with their traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
care.”341 
Finally, the Dynegy dispute shows the value of the bankruptcy law 
providing for the appointment of an examiner with the power to investigate, 
make findings, and act as a mediator.342 The examiner’s report was issued on 
March 9, 2012.343 On March 12, the bankruptcy court ordered mediation 
under the supervision of the examiner in his role as plan mediator.344 On 
March 20, 2012, defendants filed a preliminary response to the examiner’s 
report.345 On April 4, 2012, DHI reached an agreement with nearly all its 
creditors that shifted the CoalCo assets back to DHI, and provided unsecured 
 
339 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 136. 
340 Id. at 2. 
341 Id. at 139 (quoting Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 195 
n.75 (Del. Ch. 2006)). 
342 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).  
343 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 159. 
344 Order Approving Settlement, at 7, In re Dynegy Holdings, L.L.C., No. 11-38111 (CGM) 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012). 
345 Id. 
  
1978 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1907 
creditors with a 99% stake in the parent, Dynegy Inc., effectively wiping out 
existing shareholders.346 On June 1, 2012, the bankruptcy court approved the 
settlement.347 Finally, on September 5, 2012, the bankruptcy court approved 
the plan of reorganization.348 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES: IS THE CURRENT  
FRAMEWORK ADEQUATE? 
In the preceding section, I surveyed the existing framework’s robust  
resources for controlling shareholder–creditor conflicts in two key contexts. 
As the variety of contractual and noncontractual measures shows, we already 
have a wide variety of tools available. On the other hand, to the extent that 
we have become a shareholder-centric system through changes in practice, 
not changes in law, it is necessary to consider whether the law has kept pace, 
as well as alternative approaches.  
A. The Importance of Comparative Corporate Law:  
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom provides an important comparison to the United 
States. Both have large numbers of widely held or “dispersed ownership” 
corporations. Yet, although the economies are relatively similar, U.K. 
corporate law is far more “shareholder-centric” than board-centric Delaware 
corporate law. This can be illustrated by a variety of different provisions. 
The core, fundamental decisionmaking body under U.K. law is the share-
holders acting in the general meeting.349 U.K. shareholders have the power 
to elect directors, and importantly, the power to remove directors, with or 
without cause, before the expiration of their terms of office.350 This is 
important because shareholders, without board acquiescence or special 
provision in the articles of incorporation, additionally have the power to call 
a general meeting.351 These provisions eliminate the entrenchment made 
possible by staggered boards.352 Shareholders may force the company, at its 
 
346 Joseph Checkler, Dynegy Reaches a Pact with Lenders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2012, at B3.  
347 See generally Order Approving Settlement, supra note 344. 
348 Joseph Checkler, Judge Confirms Dynegy’s Plan to Exit Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 
2012, at B9. 
349 PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF 
MODERN COMPANY LAW 435-499 (9th ed. 2012).  
350 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168 (Eng.). 
351 Id. §§ 303–305. 
352 John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—
The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1737 (2007). 
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own expense, to circulate resolutions to be voted on at the annual general 
meeting.353 In addition, shareholders enjoy mandatory preemption rights.354 
The shareholder-centric character of U.K. law is particularly striking in the 
control context. Under the Takeover Code, directors must remain largely 
passive when a tender offer is made for the company’s shares and cannot 
take any “frustrating action” without shareholder approval.355 
U.K. law may be shareholder-centric, but it also imposes robust creditor-
regarding duties, primarily under the rubric of “wrongful trading.” 356 
Section 214 imposes liability if “at some time before the commencement of 
the winding up of the company, that person knew or ought to have concluded 
that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going 
into insolvent liquidation,” and did not take “every step with a view to 
minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors as . . . he ought 
to have taken.”357 My LBO hypothetical presents an easy case. The directors 
knew that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency because 
that is what the bankers told them, and they cannot claim that they took 
every step with a view to minimizing the potential loss to creditors because, 
in the hypothetical, they took none.358  
With a knowledge standard of “knew or ought to have concluded” that is 
interpreted according to the “objective” standard of a “reasonably diligent 
person having both (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are 
carried out by that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that that director has,”359 one can under-
stand directors’ concerns with personal liability. On the other hand, and 
important to understanding the balance struck, while directors face personal 
 
353 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 338–340 (Eng.). 
354 Id. § 561. 
355 PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, 
Rule 21.1, at I13 (10th ed. 2011), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content 
/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf; see also id. Gen. Principle 3, at B1. For background on this prohibition, 
see Armour & Skeel, supra note 352, at 1773. 
356 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Eng.). For a concise but comprehensive overview of 
directors’ creditor-regarding duties in the United Kingdom and on the continent, see Paul Davies, 
Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, in 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 
303 (Horst Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön, eds. 2008).  
357 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214(2)-(3) (Eng.). 
358 See EILÍS FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 40-41 (2008) (discussing 
the requirements of section 214); DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS 296-97 (2009) (discussing “shadow directors” in the context of section 214). 
359 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214(4) (Eng.). 
  
1980 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1907 
liability for wrongful trading, the court determines what contribution the 
person shall make, if any, to the company’s assets. In addition, the wrongful 
trading provision only applies in insolvent liquidation and not when there 
are reorganizations through other procedures such as administrations, 
schemes of arrangement, or workouts.360 Because of a variety of other 
differences between the United States and United Kingdom, the level of 
enforcement is quite low.361 Even so, by all accounts, directors are very 
conscious of the potential for wrongful-trading liability and the provision 
has been criticized for potentially chilling entrepreneurial activity and 
hurting creditors by inducing firms to cease trading prematurely in order to 
avoid potential director liability.362  
Yet, this legal and reputational risk can be managed. KKR and Black-
stone have large London offices and private equity is alive and well in the 
United Kingdom. How does the presence of a “wrongful trading” provision 
with the potential for director liability affect the process and structure for 
an LBO? Deals are said to be less leveraged than in the United States and, 
prior to approving a transaction, target boards typically require a solvency 
opinion from their bankers.363 What makes the U.K. approach such an 
interesting comparative case is that it shows how one recognizably similar 
system has defined directors’ creditor-regarding duties, how deal lawyers 
adjust, and how it potentially contributes to reducing extreme leverage—even 
as differences in complementary institutions might make one reluctant to 
transplant the United Kingdom’s “wrongful trading” provision to Delaware. 
Comparative corporate law can also be useful in addressing the optimal 
mix and development of tools: Is it better to broaden the restrictions on 
distributions to shareholders or rely on the traditional view that directors 
owe fiduciary duties to the corporation (rather than the shareholders 
 
360 Horst Eidenmüller, Trading in Times of Crisis: Formal Insolvency Proceedings, Workouts and 
the Incentives for Shareholders/Managers, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTEC-
TION, supra note 356, at 241, 251. 
361 PAUL L. DAVIES WITH SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF 
MODERN COMPANY LAW 223-24 (8th ed. 2008). The low level of enforcement has been 
attributed to difficulties in financing wrongful-trading actions: liquidators, short on funds, are 
apparently reluctant to spend money on any but the strongest cases; secured creditors are not 
willing to finance cases because the law is clear that recoveries all go to benefit the unsecured 
creditors; finally, the cause of action cannot be assigned to an entrepreneurial lawyer as doing so 
would be “champertous” and thus illegal. Id. 
362 See generally Re Cont’l Assurance Co. of London plc (in liquidation) (No. 4), [2001] 2 
B.C.L.C. 287 (Ch.). For a review of the criticisms, see Davies, supra note 356, at 317-27. 
363 Interview with William F. Charnley, Partner, King & Spalding L.L.P., in Oxford, Eng. 
(June 7, 2011). 
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directly)? This is a complicated question that has arisen in other corporate 
law systems and that is beyond the scope of this Article.364 
B. The Divided Architecture of U.S. Corporate Law and the  
Specification of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
A striking feature of the small set of Delaware cases dealing with the 
duties of directors in or near bankruptcy is the fact that there are so few of 
them. Directors’ creditor-regarding fiduciary duties are underspecified, 
especially in comparison with the United Kingdom’s approach. This is 
partly a result of the United States’ distinctive divided architecture of 
corporate and insolvency law. Delaware courts adjudicate disputes in solvent 
corporations, while bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over most insolvent 
firms. Although many of the underlying rights enforced in bankruptcy are 
determined by state law,365 the forum and procedures by which they are 
enforced are a matter of federal bankruptcy law. This leads to a variety of 
oddities and complexities.366 
The United Kingdom, with its unitary, rather than divided judicial 
architecture, offers an interesting comparison case. Unlike in the United 
States, a single group of judges—the Chancery Division of the High 
Court—hears both “Company Law” matters and insolvency cases, including 
the winding up of companies.367  
 
364 I owe this point to Assaf Hamdani, who argues that Israel, an economy characterized by 
controlling shareholder structures, shows the value of expanding restrictions on distributions by, 
for example, giving creditors the right to sue derivatively to enjoin distributions in solvent firms, 
over relying on fiduciary duties. 
365 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and 
defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why 
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.”). 
366 David Skeel has written incisively on the division of labor between corporate law and 
bankruptcy, and its effects, which he refers to as “vestigialization.” See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2009); David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). As 
a bankruptcy specialist, he has primarily focused on how this division of labor has slowed the 
development of bankruptcy doctrine (e.g., the development of state preference law, rules 
governing derivative suits by creditors in bankruptcy, and corporate voting in bankrupt corpora-
tions). As he points out, when all insolvent firms end up in bankruptcy court, there is little 
incentive for states to keep their state law insolvency procedures up to date, or to pay much 
attention to doctrines that govern issues that arise exclusively in bankruptcy. This section 
continues that inquiry, but with a corporate lawyer’s focus on directors’ duties. 
367 Compare Company Act, 2006, c. 46, § 1156 (Eng.) (defining “the court”), and Insolvency Act, 
1986, c. 45, § 117 (Eng.) (granting the court jurisdiction to wind up companies), with CHANCERY 
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The U.S. architecture has dramatically influenced the development of 
the common law of corporations.368 First, the different courts understand 
their roles differently. Bankruptcy is, fundamentally, about restructuring 
debtor–creditor relations, and not about the adjudication of state-created 
rights and duties.369 This core function sets the tasks of the bankruptcy 
court and bankruptcy practitioners, which include the following: staying 
collection efforts; sorting out creditors’ claims; designing plans of reorgani-
zation (in the case of Chapter 11); and moving forward with dispatch. State 
law fiduciary duty claims against directors (who are not parties to the 
bankruptcy) can enter this process as part of maximizing the assets of the 
debtor’s estate, but, with the important goal of quick resolution and exit, 
they will necessarily be treated as secondary concerns. The tasks of Dela-
ware Chancery Courts and the Supreme Court are entirely different. 
Although accustomed to deciding matters quickly in order to allow transac-
tions to proceed, a key part of the Delaware courts’ mission is to define and 
articulate the duties of directors.  
These differing institutional roles combine with the divided architecture 
to create selection bias. Delaware courts focus primarily on the rights of 
shareholders and bondholders in solvent corporations because those are the 
main types of cases they see. Bankruptcy courts primarily focus on unse-
cured versus secured creditor issues in insolvent corporations because those 
are the cases they see. Directors’ creditor-regarding duties—prominent in 
unitary systems like the United Kingdom—fall between the two poles. 
Second, bankruptcy courts, like federal district courts sitting in diversity, 
are limited in their ability to develop corporate law’s creditor-protection 
features systematically because these are part of Delaware corporate law, not 
federal bankruptcy law. As in other situations when a court applies non-
forum law, anything a bankruptcy court or a district court says about 
Delaware corporate law is essentially a guess about how the Delaware 
Supreme Court would decide. By contrast, when a bankruptcy court applies 
 
GUIDE 2013, ch. 20, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/ 
chancery-division (treating proceedings under the Chancery Division).  
368 It is important to realize the large extent to which Delaware corporate law is common 
law. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1591-97 (2005). See generally Rock, supra note 176. 
369 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (Brennan, J.) 
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he restructuring of debtor–creditor relations, which is at the core of the 
federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private 
rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is at issue in this case.”). 
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the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer jurisprudence, it is applying 
bankruptcy law.370  
Finally, and most importantly, a unitary system keeps both shareholder 
and creditor issues in front of the same set of judges. When judges have 
cases raising both types of issues, they are more likely to focus on the 
conflict between shareholder and creditors interests, especially at the 
solvent–insolvent boundary. 
Delaware courts have the expertise but not the cases. Bankruptcy courts 
have the cases but do not have the necessary corporate law expertise, time, 
or incentives. Amending the Delaware constitution to permit bankruptcy 
courts to certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court would provide 
some useful insight.371 This sensible change has the potential to increase the 
flow of cases, but it is not clear by how much. Because certification inter-
rupts the flow of the case, bankruptcy judges can be expected to use it 
sparingly, instead relying on the parties to brief the issues and then deciding 
the issue themselves. In addition, answers provided on a necessarily incom-
plete record may be of uncertain value. Without the benefit of a full factual 
record, the Delaware Supreme Court is less able to engage in the common 
law-making process as it considers how Delaware law should evolve in the 
face of changing conditions. Finally, bankruptcy has some compensating 
institutions which make appeal to Delaware less pressing. In particular, the 
power to appoint an expert examiner to analyze potential claims and 
provide advice to the court is extremely valuable. As the Dynegy case 
shows, an able examiner, with expertise in both bankruptcy law and Dela-
ware law, can help bankruptcy judges bridge the two systems. 
C. Delaware’s Role as Impartial Umpire 
Delaware’s preeminence as a corporate law jurisdiction is explained in 
part by the excellence of its courts in adjudicating conflicts. Delaware’s fans 
 
370 In a unitary system such as the United Kingdom’s, with the same judges hearing corporate 
law and insolvency matters, there will be a much more continuous development in both corporate and 
insolvency law. Insolvency focuses the mind wonderfully and raises core corporate law duty issues in a 
context in which breaches arguably caused real harm. Strikingly, a significant number of important 
U.K. company law cases are insolvency cases. See, e.g., Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1896] A.C. 22 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (corporation as legal person); Re Bluebrook Ltd, [2009] EWHC 
(Ch) 2114, [2010] 1 B.C.L.C. 338 (Ch.) (related party transactions and valuation); Regentcrest plc (in 
liquidation) v. Cohen, [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 80 (Ch.) (good faith duty); Re D’Jan of London Ltd., [1993] 
B.C.C. 646 (Ch.) (duty of care); In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., [1924] 1 Ch. 407 (director fraud). 
371 See generally Henry duPont Ridgely, Avoiding the Thickets of Guesswork: The Delaware  
Supreme Court and Certified Questions of Corporation Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 1127 (2010). 
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(including me) believe that incorporation in Delaware benefits shareholders 
because its law and courts do better than any alternative jurisdiction in 
striking the balance between shareholders and managers, and between 
controlling and noncontrolling shareholders. Does Delaware do as good a 
job policing shareholder–creditor conflicts? There may be reason for 
concern. 
There is an intriguing strand of finance research that purports to identify 
a link among legal rules protecting creditors, capital structure, and market 
valuation. John Wald and Michael Long report that U.S. manufacturing 
firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions use less 
debt.372 Yaxuan Qi and Wald find that firms incorporated in states with 
stronger payout restrictions are less likely to include creditor-protective 
debt covenants that constrain payouts, limit additional debt, or restrict the 
sale of assets.373 Sattar Mansi, William Maxwell, and Wald find that firms 
incorporated in states with more restrictive payout rules have better credit 
ratings and significantly lower yield spreads than firms incorporated in less 
restrictive states.374  
These studies are flawed because there are no significant differences in 
restrictions on distributions to shareholders in different states.375 But that 
 
372 John K. Wald & Michael S. Long, The Effect of State Laws on Capital Structure, 83 J. FIN. 
ECON. 297, 315-16 (2007). 
373 Yaxuan Qi & John Wald, State Laws and Debt Covenants, 51 J.L. & ECON. 179, 203 (2008). 
374 Sattar A. Mansi, William F. Maxwell & John K. Wald, Creditor Protection Laws and the 
Cost of Debt, 52 J.L. & ECON. 701, 716-18 & n.31 (2009). 
375 For the basics of stock repurchase and dividend regulation, see supra subsection IV.A.2. In 
these studies, the authors take the “minimum asset-to-debt” ratio for a distribution as the measure 
of the stringency of the state law restrictions on distributions. See, e.g., Mansi, Maxwell & Wald, 
supra note 374, at 707. These studies find that in Delaware this constraint equals 0, in New York it 
equals 1, and in California it equals 1.25 (Delaware, New York, and California are the three main 
jurisdictions and drive all the results). Id. The most significant finding is that creditors have 
greater confidence in firms incorporated in New York or California, with robust limitations on 
distributions to shareholders, than those incorporated in Delaware, with no significant restrictions. 
Id. at 721. But, contrary to the authors’ assertions, there is little interstate variation in the legal 
rules restricting distributions to shareholders, even though there are some differences in statutory 
language. 
As noted above, one traditional limitation on the source of distributions is that they must be 
out of “surplus”—a term of art meaning the value of the firm’s assets exceeds its liabilities plus 
some cushion, a type of “balance sheet solvency” test. The only difference between states is their 
definition of the “cushion”: Delaware and New York use the traditional “stated capital” approach, 
in which the cushion is the aggregate “par value” plus additional amounts designated by the board 
of directors. BLACK, supra note 179, §§ 2:23 (Delaware), 2:33 (New York). California substituted 
the reliance on par value with a mandatory 25% cushion, with a variety of subrules for what is 
included in the calculation of assets and liabilities. Id. § 3:12. States that follow the Model Business 
Corporation Act likewise dispense with par value, but do not include the 25% cushion (a position 
that California adopted in 2011). Id. §§ 3:1–3:8. There is no reason to think that aggregate par 
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only makes the studies more interesting: they have found statistically 
significant differences among states, with creditors apparently preferring 
New York and California over Delaware. Indeed, it seems that U.S. manu-
facturing firms incorporated outside of Delaware are less leveraged; are less 
likely to include creditor-protective debt covenants that constrain payouts, 
limit additional debt, or restrict the sale of assets; and have better credit 
ratings and significantly lower yield spreads.  
This “Delaware effect” seems to be real. What could be causing it, if it is 
not a result of different legal rules on distributions to shareholders? One 
possible interpretation of the results is that creditors view Delaware courts 
as “equity courts” in which equity holders (i.e., shareholders) systemically 
do better than creditors.  
This is consistent with other findings. Ted Eisenberg and Geoff Miller 
argue that New York is to contracting what Delaware is to incorporation: 
the preferred choice of discerning consumers. Using a large sample of 
corporate contracts, Eisenberg and Miller show that New York law is the 
overwhelming choice of law for financing contracts, and for other types of 
major business contracts as well.376 Moreover, New York is the designated 
forum in 41% of contracts with a forum selection clause, with Delaware 
designated in only 11% of such contracts.377  
New York’s success in attracting major corporate contracts is not acci-
dental. According to Eisenberg and Miller, New York competes for major 
commercial contracts in much the same way as Delaware competes for 
 
value in Delaware or New York corporations is systematically higher or lower than California’s 25% 
cushion, as applied. 
The real difference among state statutes, not mentioned in the finance studies, is the presence 
of an “equity solvency” limitation. California, New York, and states following the Model Business 
Corporation Act all include a provision prohibiting distributions if, as the Model Business Code 
states, “after giving [the distribution] effect: (1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts 
as they become due in the usual course of business.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 6.40(c) (2008); 
see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West 1990); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 510(a) (McKinney 2003). 
Although the Delaware code does not contain any such provision, it was long ago adopted by case 
law. See, e.g., SV Inv. Partners v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d, 37 
A.3d 205 (Del. 2011). In addition, state and federal fraudulent conveyance rules contain overlap-
ping restrictions (albeit without director liability). 
It is thus hard to identify any actual difference in the restrictions imposed on boards of directors 
in paying dividends or repurchasing stock. As far as I can tell, lawyers advising boards of directors on 
distributions to shareholders do not give different advice based on state of incorporation. 
376 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of 
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1475, 1489 (2009).  
377 Id. at 1504 tbl.11. 
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corporations, namely, by offering “a menu of substantive rules that are 
desired by the contracting parties and by providing prompt, efficient, and 
reliable procedures and institutions for resolving disputes.”378  
Finally, these findings are consistent with the politics of Delaware cor-
porate law. Casual empiricism suggests that corporate law in Delaware, 
while influenced by shareholder interests and managerial interests, does not 
have an equally well-organized creditor lobby.379 This contrasts with New 
York, where creditor interests are well-organized and active in ensuring that 
New York remains a center for commercial law.380  
Should Delaware be concerned that investors believe it favors equity over 
debt? Perhaps Delaware should worry, if inadequate creditor protection raises 
a firm’s cost of capital and thereby affects the desirability of Delaware law. 
D. Our “Model” of the Corporation 
Two ways of thinking about corporations (what in some contexts are 
called “models”) coexist somewhat uneasily within corporate law: the 
“entity” model, which views the corporation as a social institution; and the 
“property” (or even “contract”) model, which views the corporation as 
nothing more than the property of its shareholders.381 Each can claim 
preeminence in different eras, with the property model dominant in the 
19th century, the entity model emerging with the rise of managerialism in 
the 1930s, and the property model reemerging during the 1980s.382 Each 
 
378 Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2073, 2073-74 (2009); see also THE CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK FORCE ON COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK 9-14 (2012), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/PDFs/Chief 
JudgesTaskForceOnCommercialLitigationInThe21stpdf.pdf (recommending improvements to retain 
New York’s status as “an attractive forum for commercial litigation”). 
379 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New 
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 680 (2005) (“[C]orporation law in 
Delaware is influenced by only the two constituencies whose views are most important in 
determining where entities incorporate: managers and stockholders . . . [I]t is . . . fair to say 
that both groups have a lot of clout, and that Delaware corporate lawmakers seriously consider 
each group's perspective on all key issues.”). 
380 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 376, at 1492 (noting that New York’s dominant role in 
finance contracts “likely is reinforced by the location of large banks in New York”). 
381 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 261, 266-72 (1992). In a very interesting recent article, Justice Jack Jacobs has pointed out 
the misalignment between the current model implicit in Delaware case law—that of passive, 
helpless, and ignorant shareholders—and the reality of concentrated shareholders. See Jack B. 
Jacobs, Does the New Corporate Shareholder Profile Call for a New Corporate Law Paradigm?, 18 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 21 (2012). 
382 See generally Allen, supra note 381. 
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finds support in features of Delaware law.383 Somewhat counterintuitively, 
the more the reality becomes shareholder-centric and descriptively con-
forms to the “property” model, the more important the “entity” view of the 
corporation becomes for law and practice, especially when the business 
judgment rule and exculpation provisions protect directors from liability. 
These sorts of “models” can be both positive and normative. When used 
prescriptively, the basic understanding of the corporation orients fiduciaries 
in the performance of their duties and courts in the review of that perfor-
mance. For example, an entity view of the corporation is important for 
compensation committees as they consider how to structure compensation: 
it reminds them that the goal of the exercise is to create valuable firms. 
The entity view is more broadly important in orienting managers and 
directors, serving as a counterweight to their self-interests. When managers 
owned little or no stock in their firms, requiring them to manage for the 
entity’s benefit reinforced their tendencies to confuse self-interest with 
duty-fulfillment. The great virtue of Jensen and Meckling’s deflationary and 
reductionist “nexus of contracting” view was that it put pressure on the 
managerialist model that had provided a cover story for management 
entrenchment. Exhorting fiduciaries to maximize shareholder value, by 
contrast, pushed them to look beyond their interest in keeping their jobs to 
the interests of the shareholders, whose interests (unlike creditors’) were 
not already aligned with their own.  
The problem is that when managers start to think like shareholders, a 
normative model that enjoins fiduciaries to focus exclusively or predomi-
nantly on shareholder interests will only reinforce their self-interested 
tendencies. When the key questions involve conflicts among the various 
stakeholders in the firm—shareholders versus creditors and controlling versus 
noncontrolling shareholders—a different normative model is required.  
In these circumstances, the entity view becomes critically important, not 
because a corporation is “really”—from some metaphysical or conceptual 
perspective—an entity rather than an aggregate, but for normative and 
instrumental reasons. When key conflicts exist between controlling and 
noncontrolling shareholders, the entity view, by encouraging the board to 
serve the interests of the corporate entity rather than the controlling 
 
383 For example, the rules governing standing in derivative suits emerge out of the “entity” 
conception of the corporation, a conception in which fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation 
itself. By contrast, doctrines like Revlon “duties” are more consistent with a model that views the 
corporation as nothing more than a network or nexus of contracts with fiduciary duties owed to 
the shareholders.  
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shareholder, provides useful guidance and a valuable counterweight. Like-
wise, when key conflicts exist between equity and debt, and when managers 
have robust equity incentives, enjoining the board to serve the interests of 
the corporate entity rather than equity will provide useful counterbalancing 
pressures that challenge the human tendency to confuse self-interest with 
right conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The world has changed. The old picture of the managerial corporation 
in which managers, compensated like bureaucrats, entrench themselves at 
the expense of helpless and passive shareholders is dead and should be 
buried. Managers now largely think and act like shareholders. 
In thinking about disputes among participants in the corporation, we 
should stop assuming that there is a significant divergence of interests 
between passive shareholders and entrenching managers. Given the changes 
in the world, it would be more plausible to assume that managers think like 
shareholders, for better and for worse. But, more to the point, there is no 
reason to assume anything: it is easy enough to prove what managers’ actual 
incentives are. The relevant information is all disclosed. 
When managers’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ interests, a 
misalignment opens up between shareholder–manager interests on the one 
side and creditor interests on the other. When this happens, creditors might 
plausibly claim that shareholders and managers are seeking to transfer value 
from creditors in a way that impairs firm value. It is, of course, a separate 
matter whether the attempt infringes on any legally cognizable creditor 
interests. But, when interpreting creditor–firm contracts, applying traditional, 
legal limitations on distributions to shareholders, and analyzing new situa-
tions that arise, courts would do well to be on the lookout for opportunistic 
behavior. 
We should remember that “shareholder value maximization” is only a tool 
for building valuable companies and a rich society. Like any tool, it can be 
overused. As shown above, the law contains a variety of legal tools to temper 
the focus on equity value—to introduce “cooling rods” into the “reactor core” 
to prevent meltdown. Having lived through the financial meltdown of 2008, 
we should all be a bit more cautious about strategies that increase risk or 
depend on an assumption that bankruptcy costs are trivial. Paying attention 
to creditors can be a useful proxy for the universe of nonshareholder interests. 
Ultimately, I am arguing less for changing the law than for changing the 
conversation. Rather than yet another permutation of old shareholder-
versus-manager debates, we should look around at what the actual conflicts 
are and consider what to do about them. 
